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I. INTRODUCTION 
After the United States Constitution was drafted in 1787, the 
document was translated into German and Dutch for the 
German- and Dutch-speaking populations of Pennsylvania and 
New Y ork. 1 Although copies of both the German- and Dutch-
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1. The primary translations this Article will refer to are: YERFMIREN DER 
YEREINIGTEN CONVENTION GEHALTEN ZU PHILADELPHIA, IN DEM JAHR 17X7, lJND 
DEM ZWOLFfEN JAHR DER AMERICANISCHEN lJNABIIAN(iiGKEIT. AUF YLRORDNUNU 
DER GENERAL ASSEMBLY VON PENNSYLVANIEN AlJS Dl M ENGLISCHEN lJBERSETZT 
(Michael Billmeyer co., presumed 17X7) !hereinafter "U.S. CONST. (German)"!, 
http://modcrn-constitutions.de/US-00-17X7-0l)-17-dc-e.html; and CHARLES R. WEBSTER, 
DE CONSTITLJTIE, EENPARIGLYK GEACCORDEERD BY DE ALGEMFENE CONVENTIE, 
GEHOLJDEN IN DE STAD VON PHILADELPHIA, IN'T JAAR 17X7: EN GESlJBMITTEERD AAN 
HET YOLK DER YEREENIGDE STAATEN VAN NOORD-AMERIKA, YERT/\ALD DOOR 
LAMBERTUS DE RONDE, CiEDRlJCKT BY ORDER VAN DE FEDERAL COMMITTEE, IN DE 
1 
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language Constitutions have been preserved2 and are reprinted in 
a German collection of constitutions edited by Horst Dippel,' 
they have largely escaped analysis until now. 4 This Article 
examines the text of the translations and explains how they can 
clarify the meaning of the Constitution's original text. 
By presenting and analyzing translations of the Constitution, 
this Article makes several modest but significant contributions to 
the field of constitutional interpretation. Principally, the 
translations provide evidence of the Constitution's original public 
meaning- the meaning of the text as understood by its 
contemporary translators and as reflected in their interpretive 
choices. This evidence may be of particular value when studying 
clauses in the Constitution that have not typically been the subject 
of discussion and commentary. The translations also provide 
examples of situations where there were multiple "original public 
meanings"- where members of the public developed different 
interpretations of the same text. More generally, this Article 
proposes that translations constitute a uniquely advantageous 
source of constitutional commentary by virtue of their ability to 
comprehensively and contextually analyze the Constitution's text. 
Unlike other sources, such as published pamphlets, the ratifiers' 
STAD VAN ALBANY (17XX) lhen:inafter "U.S. CONST. (Dutch)"!, http://modern-
constitutions.de/US-00-17X7-09-17-nl-e.html. Both documents arc reprinted in I 
CONSTITUTIONS OF TilE WORLD FROM THE LATE I XTH CENTURY TO TilE MIDDLE OF 
THE 19TH CENTURY (Horst Dippel ed., 2006) !hereinafter "I DIPPEL" I. 
2. An original copy of the German-language U.S. Constitution can he found at the 
Lilly Library at Indiana University, Bloomington, and an original copy of the Dutch-
language U.S. Constitution is on file in the Historical and Special Collections of the 
Harvard Law Library. See U.S. CONST. (German), http://www.modern-
constitutions.de/nhu.php?page_id=02a I h5aX6frt 39471 cOb I c57123acl %&show_doc=US-
00-17X7-0lJ-17-de&viewmode=thumhview (last visited Oct. 14, 2015) (:,tating that the Lilly 
Library, Indiana University has made copies of the German translation of the U.S. 
Constitution availahlc ); U.S. CONST. (Dutch), http://www.modern-
constitutions.de/nhu.php?page_id=02a I h5aX6ffl 39471 cOb I c57123acllJ6&show_doe=lJS-
00-17X7-0lJ-17-nl&viewmode=thumhview (last visited Oct. 14, 2015) (stating that the 
Historical and Special Collections of the Harvard Law Library has made copies of the 
Dutch translation of the U.S. Constitution available). 
3. I DIPPEL, supra note I (comprising the U.S. Constitution in English, German, 
and Dutch, as well as each proposed amendment in English and German through IXIO). 
4. The German translation is so ohscure that the Library of Congress website 
appears to be unaware of its existence, incorrectly surmising that the Dutch translation was 
the earliest publication of the Constitution in a non-English language. See Widespread 
Interest in the FoundinR Dommenls, LIHR. OF CONGRESS., http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/ 
creating-the-united-states/constitution-lcgaey.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2015) ("Displayed 
here is a 17XX copy of the Constitution in Dutch, perhaps the earliest example of its 
puhlication in a language other than English."). 
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speeches, or contemporary dictionaries, the translated 
constitutions exhaustively restate every term and phrase in the 
Constitution and represent those terms and phrases in context. 
Part II will introduce the translations by situating them in 
historical context. Part III will turn to the value of using 
translations to interpret the Constitution in the present day. The 
text of the translations will be analyzed in Part IV. Accompanying 
this paper is also an appendix, which includes a table of the 
English, Dutch, and German texts, together with extensive 
annotations and notes on the peculiarities of these translations. 5 
Our aim is for these comments to be a helpful tool when using the 
translations to explore the meaning of the Constitution. 
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION IN TRANSLATION 
On September 17, 1787, the Philadelphia Constitutional 
Convention adjourned after completing the drafting of the 
Federal Constitution. By the next morning, 500 copies had been 
printed in English, to be distributed to Congress, state governors, 
and state legislators. 6 
Shortly after the convention adjourned, Pennsylvania's 
congressional delegation requested a meeting with the 
Pennsylvania General Assembly, the state's legislative body.7 
Benjamin Franklin hoped that by quickly ratifying the 
Constitution, Pennsylvania could secure the location of the new 
nation's capital.~ On Monday, September 24, 1787, and Tuesday, 
September 25, 1787, the Pennsylvania assembly ordered the 
printing of 3,000 copies of the Constitution in English and 1,500 
copies of the Constitution in German "to be distributed 
throughout th[ e] state for the inhabitants thereof."l) At the time, 
5. See infra app. 
6. PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: TilE PEOPLE DEBATE TilE CONSTITUTION, 
17X7-17XX, at 27 (2010). 
7. !d. at 59. 
X. !d. 
9. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OFTHl' RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
62-64 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) !hereinafter DHRC II 1. On September 24, Assemblyman 
William Findlay moved that 3,000 copies he printed in English and .'iOO printed in German. 
!d. at 62. Later in the day it appears Findlay moved for I ,000 copies to he printed in English 
and 500 copies in German, and the motion "was agreed to.'' !d. at 63. The following day, 
"IAssemhlymanl Rohert Whitehall!,! thinking the numher. ordered !the previous day! to 
he published of the plan of the federal government. I was! too small! I- .. moved to add two 
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around one-third of the population of Pennsylvania primarily 
spoke German, 111 and the relative number of constitutions printed 
in each language reflected this proportion. Assemblymen William 
Will of Philadelphia, Adam Hubley of Lancaster County, and 
Philip Kreemer of Berks County were appointed to a committee 
to "engage a proper person to translate the plan [Constitution] 
into the German language." 11 The assembly's German language 
printing was undertaken by Michael Billmeyer. 12 However, the 
translator's name does not appear on the Billmeyer copies 13 and 
does not appear to be known. 
The Dutch translation was produced separately at the 
bequest of a pro-Constitution faction. In the late 1700s, the Dutch 
language was still spoken widely in New York, specifically in the 
rural areas around New York City "west of the Hudson, in New 
Jersey, around Kingston, and along the upper reaches of the 
Hudson and the Mohawk." 14 The Dutch translation was printed in 
1788 to gather support for New York's ratification, "by Order van 
de [of the] Federal Committee," 15 a group which explicitly 
advocated ratification of the Federal Constitution iin New York. 16 
The printer of the Dutch translation, Charles Webster, owner of 
thousand more to that motion." !d. Assemhlyman Hugh Brackenridg,._: disagreed, arguing 
that, "the numher of fifteen hundred, ordered yesterday, would he enough to convey the 
information generally through the state." !d. It was eventually ordered that "two thousand 
copies in English and one thousand in German he printed in addition." !d. at 64. Adding 
the totals from SL:ptemher 24 and Septemher 25, it would appear that ],000 copies were 
printed in English and I ,500 were printed in German. Descrihing these events, Pauline 
Maier wrote, "On Tuesday, Septemher 25, the assemhly ordered two thousand copies of 
the Constitution printed in English and another thousand in German for distrihution 
throughout the state." MAIER, supra note o, at oO. Maier did not mention the Septemher 
24 order. 
10. According to the 1790 census, IoO,OOO of Pennsylvania's 4]4,]7] inhahitants 
were German, and this tongue "was the standard language in the area where the German 
population was concentrated." Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An F,ssay on 
American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official 1--,'nglish, 77 MINN. L. REV. 2o9,] 10 
( 1992) (citing 2 ALBI-RT B. FAUST, THE GERMAN ELEMENT IN THE lJNITFD STATES 14 
(1909) and HEINZ KLOSS, THE AMERICAN BILINGUAL TRADITION 140 (1977)). See also 
FRANK R. DIFFENDERI·TER, Till' GERMAN IMMIGRATION INTO PENNSYLVANIA (1977) 
(explaining that most authorities agree that German speakers in Pennsylvania constituted 
ahout one-third of the total population of Pennsylvania he tween I 7]0-1790). 
II. DHRC II, supra note 9, at 57, o]. 
12. !d. atM. 
1]. See U.S. CONST. (German), supra note I. 
14. NICOLINE VANDER SUS, COOKIES, COLESLAW, AND STOOPS: THE INFLUENCE 
Or DUTCII ON THE NORTH AMERICAN LANGUAGES ]4 (2009). 
15. I DIPPEL, supra note I, at XO. 
16. MAIER, supra note 6, at ]2X. 
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the Albany Gazette and Albany Journal, is notable for having 
printed pamphlets by both the Anti-Federal and Federal 
Committees. 17 
The Dutch translator was Lambertus De Ronde, Is a Dutch-
American minister of the Reformed Church in America (formally 
known as the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church). 19 De Ronde 
was born in Holland in 1720, and lived in the village of Zuilichem 
in Gelderland for some period until 17 46, before going to 
Suriname. 20 He visited New York in 1750. Upon De Ronde's 
arrival, he was approached by leaders of New York's Dutch 
Reformed Church "who anticipated their congregation soon 
would need another minister." 21 His preaching was praised as "so 
pleasing" 22 that he was hired by the Collegiate Church ''with the 
understanding that he was to join the Coetus." 23 
The Coetus was the larger of two warring factions within the 
Reformed Church; the other was known as the Conferentie. 
Adrian C. Lieby describes the Conferentie as a group that "often 
appeared to be moved by a violent hatred for all things 
American." 24 Although "[t]he [C]onferentie sometimes 
represented its battle as one to preserve the authority of 
Amsterdam and the ways of the fathers in the American Dutch 
church," Lieby claims that "its real objective was to oppose the 
great religious revival that had swept the colonies in the thirty 
years before the Revolution, ... that has come to be called the 
17. !d. at 333-34. On AprillO, 17HH, Webster printed a circular by the Anti-Federal 
Committee raising over thirty objections to the Constitution-about ten Jays later he 
published the Fetleral Committee's Jctaikd rebuttal. !d. 
I H. I DIPPEL, supra note 1, at HO. 
I Y. See EDWARD TANJORE CORWIN, A MANUAL OF TilE REFORMED CHURCH IN 
AMERICA (FORMERLY REFORMED PROTESTANT DUTCH CHURCH) 162H-IY02, at 417 
(4th ed. 1(}02). 
20. !d. 
21. See Joyce D. GooJfrienJ, The Cultural Metamorphosis of Domine I ,ambertus de 
Ronde, HUDSON RIVER VALLEY REV., Spring 20()(}, at 63. 
22. CORWIN, supra note IY, at 417. 
23. !d. The Ecclesiastical Recortls of State of New York state that De Ronde was 
hireJ "under condition of becoming a cm:tus." 6 ECCLESIASTICAL RECORDS OF THE 
STATE OF NEW YORK 34Y5 (Etlward Tanjore Corwin et al. cos., I Y05) [hereinafter 
ECCLESIASTICAL RECORDS[. 
24. ADRIAN C. LEIBY, TilE REVOLUTIONARY WAR IN TilE HACKENSACK VALLEY: 
THE JERSEY DUTCH AND NEUTRAL GROUND, 1775-17H3, at 20 (2J. cu. IYY2). During the 
Revolutionary War, most Confcrcntic supporters in the Hackensack Valley became 
British loyalists. /d. 
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'Great Awakening."' 2" In the 1750s and 1760s, the Coetus faction 
had adopted the liberal language of "rights" while emphasizing 
personal religious revival. To the Conferentie, such talk seemed 
to suggest that man could play a role in choosing his own 
salvation. But any suggestion that God's grace was resistible, or 
that man's free-will played a role in his own salvation, was 
heretical to the Orthodox Calvinists, whose position on this 
matter was defined at the Synod of Dordt from 1618-19. The 
Conferentie were traditionalists who held strongly to Dordt, and 
because Dordt determined the doctrines of the Dutch Reformed 
Church in the Netherlands, the Conferentie maintained ties with 
Amsterdam in order to counter what it envisioned were Arminian 
(free-will) tendencies in the American church. 2" 
Despite the expectations of De Ronde's appointment, he 
never attended another Coetus meeting and, in 1755, became a 
dedicated member of the rival Conferentie. 27 Although De Ronde 
had been a member of a committee that procured a preacher, 
Archibald Laidlie, to preach in English, De Ronde "afterward 
turned against him, and was the leading spirit of the 'Dutch 
party"' which opposed English preaching. 2x 
25. !d. 
26. See John W. lkardslce IlL The American Revolution, in .IAMFS W. VAN 
HOEVEN, PIETY AND PATRIOTISM 17-34 (llJ76). 
27. CORWIN, SUJJra note llJ, at 417. 
2K. !d. at 41 K. Laidlie "organize]d I special meetings where women by themselves, 
and men and youths by themselves expound]cd] the Scriptures by turns, repcat]cd] prayer 
from memory, discuss jed] questions of conscience, etc." Letter from Rev. Lambcrtus De 
Ronde to Rev. John Kalkocn, (Sept. lJ, 1765), in ECCLESIASTICAL RECORDS, supra note 
23, at 4006. In a letter. De Ronde described the tension: 
]E]vcr since the hour when a call was first extended to Rev. Laidlic, there has 
been no ]peace] in our congregation; that the Dutch party is much dissatisfied 
with the English party, on account of the election of certain members of the 
Consistory. These were chosen for the satisfaction of the (young) Americans, 
because they had voted for an English-speaking minister. The Dutch party took 
this very ill .... This quarrel has not abated at all since the arrivall,)f Rev. Laidlic. 
His Rev. was not willing to preach from Passion-texts, or holiday--sermons, as he 
ought to have done; nor is he willing to be subordinate .... Furthermore, he 
recommends that book of Marshall (on Sanctification), and gives utterance to 
incautious expressions, peculiar opinions, both in and out of the pulpit. All these 
things make matters worse, and cause many to fear that he will yet become an 
Independent; especially because he has many adherents." 
!d. Laidlic's all-female group "was perceived as a dangerous innovation by his orthodox 
colleague, Lambcrtus De Ronde." Joyce D. Goodfriend, Incorporating Women into the 
1/istory of the Colonial Dutch Reformed Church: Problems and Propo.wls, in PATTERNS & 
PORTRAITS: WOMEN IN THE HISTORY Of THE REFORMED CHURCH OF AMERICA 30 
(Renee S. House & John W. Coakley cds., llJlJlJ). 
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But church politics eventually spurred De Ronde to learn 
English. In 1765, De Ronde reflected, "I had to learn a language, 
against which I had an antipathy for twelve or thirteen years." 29 
By the 1760s, he frequently preached in English, at one point 
having to defend his practice of English preaching to the 
Amsterdam Classis. 30 
Although De Ronde learned to preach in English, he was 
criticized for being "not in the least qualified" to do so. 31 Historian 
Joyce D. Goodfriend observes, "[h]ow widely De Ronde read in 
English remains a matter of conjecture, but he clearly read well 
enough to be conscious of contemporary English literary 
conventions. Yet ... it is not surprising that he exhibited concern 
about his comprehension of English. "32 De Ronde described his 
English-language book A System: Containing the Principles of 
Christian Religion, Suitable to the Heidelberg Catechism as "a bold 
Undertaking, by a person so little versed in the English 
Language .... [I]t would be Presumption to pretend to write it [in 
English] with Ease and Elegance."Tl In another English-language 
book, The True Spiritual Religion, he wrote that "flowers of 
rethorick, fine style, fancy, wit, and such other ornaments" were 
"more than my skill in the English language, could produce. " 34 
The reception of De Ronde's work suggests that he 
sometimes traded conscientiousness for speed. After printing his 
book A System: Containing the Principles of the Christian 
Religion, Suitable to the Heidelberg Catechism, De Ronde was 
"admonished for leaving out an essential piece of doctrine" by the 
Amsterdam Classis. 35 De Ronde explained that "his eagerness to 
see the work in print precluded sending the manuscript to 
Amsterdam for approval" and that he would add an appendix to 
the work containing the missing material. 36 
While De Ronde was capable, he was not always held in high 
praise, and he remained partial to the Dutch language and 
customs. The Manual of the Reformed Church in America 
29. Goodfriend, supra note 21, at 64. 
30. See id. at n5~nn. 
31. !d. at n5. 
32. /d. at n7. 
33. /d. 
34. /d. at n~. 
35. !d. at n5. 
3n. Id. 
8 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 31:1 
describes unattributed impressions of De Ronde: "He did not 
possess as high a standard of character and usefulness as his 
colleague, Ritzema, yet in many points, he was respectable." 37 
However, given how much internal disagreement plagued the 
Reformed Church, it is not surprising that anyone would get 
mixed reviews. Goodfriend summarized De Ronde's complicated 
professional and personal relationship with Dutch and American 
culture. 
De Ronde ... cherished a vision of becoming a bicultural 
intermediary between the church's parties, equally honored by 
traditional Dutch artisans and worldly Anglicized merchants. 
Thwarted in his design, he ... cast himself as the vindicator of 
the Dutch partisans in their struggle against the innovations of 
the Anglicized Dutch. 1x 
Goodfriend ultimately laments others' "failure to acknowledge 
De Ronde for what might be considered his heroic efforts to 
bridge Dutch and English cultures.":w 
De Ronde reportedly stayed in New York City until1785, at 
which point he moved north to Schaghticoke, where he lived until 
his death in 1795.40 However, a note by Rev. Thornas de Witt of 
the Collegiate Dutch Reformed Church of New York indicates 
that De Ronde "retired to the country when the British took over 
[New York City] in 1776, and did not return to [his] charge at the 
close of the war, but remained in retirement in [his] old age." 41 
Goodfriend similarly explains that De Ronde and his 
contemporary, Ritzema, were "forcibly retired by a Consistory 
under the control of Anglicizers. " 42 
According to William Elliot Griffis, popularizer of claims of 
Dutch influence on early America, and author of the 1909 book 
The Story of New Netherland: The Dutch in America, De Ronde's 
translation of the Constitution into Dutch "had a tremendous 
influence among older men of the State, backing Alexander 
Hamilton, and securing New York for the Union and 
37. CORWIN, supra note llJ, at 417. 
3X. Goodfriend, supra note 21, at 70. 
3lJ. !d. at o3. 
40. See 5 APPIFfON'S CYCLOPAEDIA Or: AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 31o (James 
Grant Wilson & John Fiske eds., New York, D. Appleton & Co. lXXX). 
41. See I COLLHTIONS OF THE NEW YORK HISTORICAL SOCifTY 'J()I (IX41). 
42. Goodfriend, supra note 21, at o(). 
2016] FOUNDING-ERA TRANSLATIONS 9 
Constitution."43 Nicoline van der Sijs claims, "[T]hanks to [De 
Ronde's] translation, the Constitution received such strong 
support from the older male population that the state of New 
York came to accept it." 44 But neither author provides primary 
sources to reinforce these claims, and the extent of the Dutch 
translation's influence is presently unknown. 
The exact date of printing is not recorded on the 17R8 Dutch 
translation of the Constitution, but it was presumably printed 
before voting for convention delegates began on April 29. 45 
Eligibility to vote for convention delegates was not limited by 
property requirements, and so any free white male over 21 could 
vote. 46 According to Pauline Maier, property-less voters tended to 
vote Federalist. 47 
When the votes to elect ratifiers were counted, the 
Federalists had won nineteen seats, compared with the Anti-
Federalists' overwhelming forty-six. 4~ The Federalists had taken 
New York (Manhattan), Kings (Brooklyn), Richmond (Staten 
Island), and Westchester Counties; the Anti-Federalists had won 
the rest. 4') 
In light of the Federalists' poor showing at the delegates' 
election, it is possible that Griffis's and Vander Sijs's views of the 
positive impact of the Dutch translation has been expressed too 
strongly. Few Federalist candidates were elected to the state 
ratifying convention, and the change of heart among the elected 
Anti-Federalist delegates is best explained by events following the 
delegates' election. New York's ratifying convention began on 
June 17, 1788.50 By that time, eight states had already ratified the 
Constitution. New York's Federalist delegates hoped that if a 
ninth state ratified before the New York convention ended and 
the new Constitution went into effect in the ratifying states, then 
New York would be more likely to decide to stay with the union. 51 
As hoped, New Hampshire ratified the Constitution on June 21, 
43. WILLIAM ELLIOT GRIFriS, THE STORY OF NEW NFTIIERLAND: TilE DUTCH IN 
AMERICA 250 (190Y). 
44. Sus, supra note 14, at 35. 
45. See generally MAIER, supra note 6, at 327. 
46. !d. at327,341. 
47. !d. at 341. 
4X. !d. 
4Y. /d. 
50. !d. at 34X. 
51. See id. at342. 
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and Virginia ratified the Constitution on June 26, 1788.52 News of 
these two events reached the New York convention while it was 
still in session and tipped the balance in favor of ratification, 
despite the strong Anti-Federalist presence. 53 
Notably, a copy of the German translation of the 
Constitution is "bound up in the same volume" as the Dutch 
translation in the State Library of New York.54 It was printed 
under the same authority and is of the same date and imprint as 
De Ronde's translation. 55 This German translation was identical 
to the Billmeyer print, and the translator's name is again 
omitted.56 
III. THE INTERPRETIVE VALUE OF TRANSLATIONS 
A. TRANSLATION AS ANALYSIS 
Part of the reason we consult the works of prominent late 
eighteenth-century commentators to understand the Constitution 
is "because they reflect the considered analyses of intelligent 
observers far closer to the relevant events [of the Founding] than 
we are today."'7 De Ronde and the German translator were 
similarly-situated, intelligent members of the late eighteenth-
century American polity, but one might question whether their 
52. DHRC II, supra not~ lJ, at 23. 
53. See generallv MAIER, supra not~ 6, at 376. 
54. CORWIN, supra note llJ. at 41X-IlJ. See generally John P. Kaminski, New York: 
Fhe Reluctant [>i/far, in Till: Rl:l.l!CTANT PILLAR: N!:W YORK AND THE ADOPTION OF 
THE F;I'DI RAL CONSTITUTION (St~ph~n L. Sch~cht~r ~LL, llJX5). See also Clrcgory E. 
Maggs. ,1 Concise Guide w the Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original !VI caning of the 
Uniled States Constitution, X7 B.ll. L. RFV. XOI, X32-:n (2007). 
55. CORWIN,SllfJranot~ llJ.at41X-IlJ. 
56. I DIPPEL, supra not~ I, at M n.l (noting that th~ Billm~y~r print is id~ntical to 
th~ 17XX Charles W~hstcr print). 
57. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1356 (llJlJX). In othn words, "th~s~ works ar~ 
simply good constitutional commentary hy mcmh~rs who w~r~ or n~arly w~r~ m~mhcrs of 
th~ political community within which th~ Constitution was adopted.·' Vasan K~savan & 
Micha~l Stok~s Pauls~n. The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drajiing 
History, lJl GEO. L.J. 1113, 117X (2003). To th~ ~xt~nt that th~ original und~rstanding of 
th~ ratificrs is consid~r~d significant. th~ translations ar~ additionally r~lcvanl to thos~ 
qu~stions, as th~r~ is a good chanc~ that som~ ratifi~rs in P~nnsylvani<:1 and N~w York had 
s~~n th~ translations. Notahly, th~ chairman of th~ P~nnsylvania ratifying conv~ntion, 
Fr~d~rick Augustus Muhlcnh~rg. was th~ son of a G~rman Luth~ran pastor and had 
studi~d in Germany for many y~ars. See Oswald S~id~nstick~r. frederick Augustus Conrad 
Muhlenherg, Speaker of the /louse of Representatives, in the First Congress, 1789, 2 PENN. 
MAG. or HIST. & BIO<iRAPIIY 1X4, IX4-X5, 202 (IXXlJ). 
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translations represent "considered analyses" such as those printed 
in a pamphlet or articulated in a speech. For their translations to 
possess the exegetical value associated with contemporary 
commentary and debate, their work would need likewise to have 
an analytical component, or more precisely, for their thought 
process to include an analytic step. 
On this point, there is virtually unanimous consensus among 
textual scholars and linguists who compose the field of translation 
studies: no substantive epistemological difference exists between 
a commentary and a translation. Translation entails, and always 
has entailed, a process of analysis. Although this claim is intuitive, 
establishing it is not trivial. The competing possibility- that 
translation is some rote process, where word A in the source 
language becomes word A ' in the target- comes readily to mind. 
But on the contrary, analysis and commentary is a necessary 
part of translation. Indeed, certain scholars describe translation as 
"reported speech." 5~ Even the earliest canonical mention of 
translation in the Western tradition-Cicero's account of 
adapting Greek drama into his native Latin-describes the 
translator digesting the source language and expressing it, as he 
saw fit, in the target language. 54 Consider an example of 
translation from Roman J akobson, the most prominent member 
of the Russian formalist school of linguistics. In Jakobson's 
example, a writer is trying to translate the English sentence "She 
has brothers" (not, it will be noted, a grammatically complex 
concept in English) into another language, such as Arabic, that 
recognizes not only a singular and a plural, but also a dual form. 60 
Does the writer here use the plural form, knowing that this 
denotes at least three brothers, or the dual, which limits the total 
to two? Or perhaps it may be more desirable to write around the 
problem, translating the sentence less than literally (''She has 
more than one brother"), or else express the idea in Arabic with 
great precision but little grace ("She has two or more than two 
brothers")? Whichever option the writer chooses, the translation 
of even this simple sentence necessarily becomes an interpretive 
act, with a variety of possible consequences. In one case, the 
5X. Roman Jakohson, On Linguistic Aspects of Translation, in TilE TRANSLATION 
STUDIES READER 114 (Lawrence Venuti ed., 2000). 
59. See Cicero, /)e Oraton', in WESTERN TRANSLATION TIIIORY FROM 
HERODOTUS TO NIETZSCHE (Douglas Rohinson ed., 2002). 
()0. Jakohson, supra note 5X, at 114. 
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translator may make an error-such as by using the plural form 
when the dual would have been correct. In another., there may not 
be a fact of the matter about how many brothers the woman has, 
and the translator may choose to create a more precise meaning 
an author did not intend. In yet another case, the translator may 
know from another source how many brothers the woman has, 
and correctly add this fact in the translation, supplementing a 
reader's substantive understanding of a situation. 
In many other cases, the analytic act will not be so obvious. 
In the vast majority of cases, in fact, it is trivial. As Jakobson puts 
it, "Languages differ essentially in what they must convey and not 
in what they may convey." 61 Arabic must convey a distinction 
between two and more than two, while English tnay do so. 
However, many expressions in English and Arabic are exactly 
alike in what they must convey. The translation of any number of 
common concepts (numbers, conjunctions such as "and" and 
"or," many adjectives, etc.) may be essentially verbatim. 
Crucially, though, this does not mean that a translation is a simple 
word-to-word or phrase-to-phrase match. To determine that 
concepts are equivalent in two languages and can be verbatim-
translated is, itself, a cognitive or analytic step. To recognize areas 
where analysis is required means recognizing the ones where they 
are not; we drive through green lights not because we fail to notice 
them, but because we have seen they are not red. 
Taking these considerations to a more abstract level, the 
interpretative nature of translation follows from the realization 
that languages are neither isomorphic nor congruent to one 
another. As Ferdinand de Saussure pointed out, languages differ 
not only in the vocabulary they use to denote a certain concept 
(the "signifier"), but also in their conceptual way of slicing the 
world, leading to an inevitable incongruence that necessarily 
affects any act of translation. And as we have seen in the case of 
the "brothers" in Arabic, some languages mi!ght not only 
presuppose a different division of the world into mental concepts, 
but also are richer in vocabulary than others. Consequently, the 
translator's task does not always consist of choosing the 
correlating signifier in a different language, but often consists of 
choosing a more or less close approximation. If the target 
language is more limited, compromises in conveying the original 
fil. /d.atllfi. 
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meaning will be inevitable. If the target language is richer, the 
necessity of interpretative choices also arises: ambivalences in the 
source are not conveyable in this case, but instead need to be 
decided by the translator. A translator's choice for a certain, even 
non-corresponding or only partially corresponding correlate in 
the former case is as meaningful as a translator's choice to clear 
up an ambivalence of the source text in the latter. Both can be 
understood as a commentary on the source text. And even in cases 
of congruency of two languages (an unlikely case, since even in 
etymologically-related languages, shifts of meaning over time will 
lead to incongruence), the fact that a single word usually has a 
number of meanings that need to be distinguished still requires an 
act of interpretation when selecting the adequate semantic 
correlate. Additionally, in light of Wittgenstein, modern 
linguistics has moved away from the idea that a word has one or a 
number of fixed meanings, and instead defines the meaning of a 
word solely by its context of use, necessarily rendering any 
translation an interpretation of a source-text. 
Synthesizing three centuries of European philosophy, from 
Schleiermacher and Hegel to Heidegger, George Steiner 
advanced a theory of translation that described it as the 
"hermeneutic motion" -the very name of which describes 
translation as a process of analysis (hermeneutics) that precedes 
bringing a text into another language (the motion). 62 Indeed, even 
in one of the most rigorous and precise of all hermeneutic 
traditions- Talmudic scholarship-it is assumed that "every 
translation is always a commentary."63 De Ronde's and the 
unknown German's translations constitute, therefore, 
commentaries or "considered analyses" -an additional source to 
access the original public meaning of the Constitution as 
translated in the late 1780s. 64 
62. See George Steiner, The Hermeneutic Motion, in THE TRANSLATION STUDIES 
READER 156 (Lawrence Venuti ed., 2000). Similarly, Lawrence Lessig has noted that 
"ltlhe translator's task is always to determine how to change one text into another text, 
while preserving the original text's meaning. And hy thinking of the prohlcm faced hy the 
originalist as a prohlcm of translation, translation may teach something ahout what a 
practice of interpretive fidelity might he." Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. 
L. REV. 1165, 1173 (1lJlJ3). 
63. Jacoh Neusner, Translation and Paraphrase: The Differences and Why They 
Matter, 27 HERREW STUD. 26,35 (1lJX6). 
64. Besides these texts' exegetical value as commentary lies a further issue for the 
political theorist to chew on. If the government that was created at the slate ratifying 
conventions was the government as the puhlic understood it, then the Dutch and German 
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B. A CONTEXTUAL AND COMPREHENSIVE SOURCE 
The German and Dutch translations of the Constitution are 
not merely a source to aid constitutional interpretation; they are 
also a new kind of source, one that possesses the unique quality 
of being both contextual and comprehensive. The translations are 
contextual because each translated term is understood in relation 
to the rest of the clause and document in which it appears, rather 
than in isolation. They are comprehensive because they restate 
each and every term and phrase in the Constitution, rather than 
just those of interest. 115 
In contrast, consider the other types of textual sources that 
one might look to in order to discover the Constitution's meaning 
to the Founding-era public. Vasan Kesavan and l\1ichael Stokes 
Paulsen enumerate: 
(1) the public (and sometimes private) writings of the 
Federalists and Anti-Federalists; (2) the public debates of the 
state ratifying conventions; (3) the early congressional, 
executive, and judicial interpretations of the Constitution; ( 4) 
the works of early commentators on the Constitution; 
and ... (5) the secret drafting history of the Constitution. 66 
Consulting commentary such as these for perspectives on the 
constitutional text's meaning is a part of the constitutional 
interpreter's toolkit. 67 But these sources all present one notable 
limitation: rarely, if ever, does any single analysis purport to 
exhaustively treat an entire text- the entirety of the 
Constitution- in a consistent level of detail. (,K As a result, the 
translations could he understood as not just commentaries hut as direct delineations of the 
contours of government, along with the English-language text. Alternatively, if one 
understands the creation of the federal government as an act of the states' ceding 
sovereignty, the German translation would play a particularly significant role. Because the 
German translation was authorized hy the government of Pennsylvania for the purpose of 
helping the people of Pennsylvania decide whether to hccomc part of the new United 
States, then the powers Pennsylvania ceded arc specified in hoth the English- and German-
language documents it puhlishcd. 
h5. See DAVID BFLLOS, IS THAT A FISH IN YOUR EAR'!: TRANSLATION AND THE 
MEANING OF EVERYTHING I 07 (20 II) (stating that "unlikt.: ordinary readers, I translators] 
arc not allowed to skip."). 
hh. Kcsavan & Paulsen, supra note 57, at 1125-2h. 
h7. See PIIILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF TilE 
CONSTITUTION 7 (1lJX2); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,/\ Constructivist Coherence Theory of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 11XlJ, lllJ5-lJl) (1lJX7). 
AX. Morcovt.:r, many constitutional clauses were not dchatt.:d widely in the puhlic. 
Kcvasan & Paulsen, supra note 57. at liM (rt.:marking that "many issues and claust.:s simply 
wt.:rt.: not discussed at the state ratifying conventions"). 
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work of any one commentator~ while explicating the meaning of a 
certain section of text~ does not always situate it comparatively 
with respect to all other relevant parts of the text. In short~ 
commentaries on the Constitution's text are contextual- they 
analyze the text in context- but are rarely if ever truly 
comprehensive. 69 
By contrast~ the one common source that provides a 
potentially comprehensive reference for all possible terms- a 
contemporary dictionary- applies to the language in general~ but 
not to the specific constitutional context. 7° Further work must be 
done to determine which of several dictionary definitions~ if any~ 
is an appropriate explanation of a term as used in the Constitution 
or whether a term had acquired some specialized or technical 
• 71 
meaning. 
The translated constitutions thus boast a unique advantage 
that is not shared by other sources: they exhaustively restate every 
term and phrase in the Constitution and represent those terms 
and phrases in context. Unlike published pamphlets~ the ratifiers~ 
speeches~ or contemporary dictionaries~ these translations are 
both contextual and comprehensive. As such~ the translated 
constitutions may be not only valuable but uniquely valuable to at 
least certain investigations into original public meaning. 72 
69. See, e.g., Akhil RL:L:d Amar, lntratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 74~ (1999) 
("By viL:wing the documL:nt's clauses in splendid isolation from L:ach other- hy rL:ducing a 
single text to a jumhk of disconnected clausL:s-readers may miss the significance of larger 
patterns of meaning at work."). 
70. See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 57, at 1202. 
71. See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding 
Era to Determine the Original Meaning of the Constitution, ~2 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35~, 
373 (2014). Maggs descrihes several of the challenges of using a dictionary to resolve the 
meaning of a term in the Constitution in thL: excerpt hdow: 
!d. 
First, the definition might come from the wrong kind of dictionary. A definition 
from an English language dictionary may he inapplicahk to a constitutional term 
that has a specialized legal mL:aning, and, vice versa, a dL:finition from a legal 
dictionary may he inapplicahlc to a constitutional tcrm used in a non-specialized 
way. Second, cvL:n if thL: proper kind of dictionary is consulted, if the dictionary 
contains multiple dL:finitions for the samL: word, some of these meanings ascrihcd 
to the word may not apply to the word as it is used in the particular context of thL: 
Constitution. Third, dictionary definitions do not always capture the corrL:ct 
meaning of words that form a part of a phrase or compound, such as "Vice 
PrcsidL:nt" or "dL:clarL: war." 
72. The translations may he particularly helpful for producing intratL:xtualist 
interpretations of thL: Constitution. Intratextual interpretation involves "the interpreter 
tr!yingl to read a contested word or phrase that appears in the Constitution in light of 
anothL:r passage in the Constitution featuring the same (or a very similar) word or phrase." 
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As sources, they are hardly perfect. For instance, as the 
appendix reveals, the translations occasionally contain clear 
mistakes-in addition to potentially other more subtle errors-
that obscure the translator's actual understanding. 73 Moreover, 
discovering a slippage of meaning in the translation of the English 
to the Dutch or German versions is just half the battle; a 
researcher would need to analyze the public meaning of the Dutch 
or German terms of interest as well, requiring specialized 
knowledge and research. One would also need to posit the degree 
to which a difference in meaning was a choice made based on the 
translator's understanding of the English text, or a choice based 
on other values such as style or brevity at the expense of precision. 
Despite these challenges, the existence of multiple language 
translations of the Constitution has the potential to clarify rather 
than muddy the document's meaning. In a related context, 
Lawrence Solan has argued that the European Union's practice 
of referencing multiple, equally-authentic translations of 
European legislation actually can increase confidence in the texts' 
• 74 
meamngs. 
Sometimes a particular translation has captured [a point], but 
at other times, reading the various translations suggests a 
common theme, expressed in different words by each 
translator ... [t]he ability to compare different versions and 
then to triangulate ... brings out nuances that can help the 
in~e.stigator _to 9~in additional insight into the thoughts of the 
ongmal drafter. · 
The same potential to "triangulate" is present here. 
See Amar, supra note 6lJ, at 74X. 
73. See Maggs, supra note 71, at 37<) ( ohserving that " ... mistakes happen. Creating 
a dictionary is difficult work that requires detailed knowledge ahout a great many things. 
The lexicographer has very limited time to spend on any individual word, and it is easy to 
make a mistake, especially with uillicult words"). 
74. See Lawn.:ncc M. Solan, The Interpretation of Multilingual Statlltes by the 
European Court of Justice, 3413ROOK. J. INT'L L. 277, 2lJ4-300 (200<J). Others have argued 
the intuitive position that "adding language versions to a single hotly of law can only he a 
source of confusion." Lawrence M. Solan, Multilingualism and Morality in Statutory 
Interpretation, I LAN<iliAGE & L./LINGUAGEM E DIREITO 5, 7 (2014); Janny Leung, 
Statutory Interpretation in Multilingual Jurisdictions: Typology and Trends, 33 J. 
Ml!LTILINGUAL & M!ILTICULTliRAL DEY. 4XI (2012). 
75. Solan, The Interpretation of Multilingual Statutes, supra note 74. at 2<J2-lJ3. 
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IV. THE TRANSLATIONS 
The early German and Dutch translations of the Constitution 
speak to numerous constitutional debates, several of which are 
discussed at length below because of their particular significance. 
Other clauses are briefly annotated In the appendix 
accompanying this Article. 76 
The cost of this broad treatment is a lack of depth. Any full 
exegesis of the translations would require delving deeply into the 
original public meaning of not just the English language, but the 
Dutch and German language as well. Whole articles and books 
have been written about single words in the original Federal 
Constitution. We do not pretend to be able to speak 
authoritatively about the entire translated document in a single 
Article. Nonetheless, we provide brief explorations of key phrases 
and terms as illustrations of how the translations were rendered 
and as guideposts for further analysis. 
The authors are also keenly aware that the act of describing 
the Dutch and German texts in English introduces further 
opportunity to misunderstand what the translators believed they 
were writing. We have worked to minimize this problem by 
relying on scholars who regularly work with late eighteenth-
century German and Dutch texts. Nonetheless, as noted above, 
every translation is also a commentary. It is a given that different 
readers may reasonably disagree on the meaning of the Dutch and 
German texts-as they do already when analyzing the 
Constitution in English. 
Before considering specific clauses, several notes may be 
made about the translations as a whole. De Ronde's Dutch 
translation is notable for how closely it tracks the English-
language Constitution. As Dippel describes, "This Dutch 
translation has a special flavor due to the fact that [De Ronde], a 
Dutch-American, followed the original phrasing very closely, 
readily adopting English terms when no Dutch equivalent seemed 
to be at hand, which sometimes renders the translation difficult to 
understand for a Dutchman." 77 On the one hand, De Ronde is 
concerned with producing a translation for a particular Dutch-
American audience, not a Dutch-speaking audience in the 
Netherlands. He could then assume of his audience some 
7o. See infra app. 
77. I DIPPEL, supra note I, at X4 n.l. 
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familiarity with English words and American phrases. By 
adhering closely to the literal meaning of the Constitution and 
keeping the cognate translation wherever possible (instead of say, 
using a synonymous non-cognate of the English word), De Ronde 
was also preparing his audience for a future in which they would 
need to understand American legal terms in their American 
context. By using cognates, even when these words were 
uncommon in Dutch, De Ronde found an easy path to providing 
a translation that did not have to struggle between choosing the 
most precise and most common Dutch equivalent of the English 
text.7x 
The German translation of the Constitution used here is a 
Michael Billmeyer print. 70 According to Dippel, it is not identical 
to "the first two German translations" which appeared in the 
Gemeinniitzige Philadelphische Correspondenz on September 25, 
1787, or to a translation in Neue Unpartheyische Lancaster 
Zeitung, printed on September 26, 1787.xo However, the Billmeyer 
text was commissioned by the Pennsylvania General Assembly, 
was distributed among the German-speaking population of 
Pennsylvania, and is identical to three contemporary editions of 
the translation by Matthias Bortgis in 1787, Charles Webster in 
1788, and Melchior Steiner in 1788.t\1 
Although not much is known about the German translator, a 
number of things can be deduced about his person from this 
translations. As did De Ronde, he followed the original phrasing 
of the Constitution very closely, sometimes even adopting English 
terms when a German equivalent would have been at hand. He 
likely did not, or did not always, use a dictionary, since some of 
his translations are not the obvious choice, and the words he chose 
are often not the ones contemporary dictionaries list. x2 There is 
7X. Cognates that appear in De Ronde's translation include "privikgic" for 
"privilege" (art. I,* lJ, cl. 2); "hill van attainder" for "hill of attainder" and "ex post facto 
wet" for "ex post facto law" (art. I, * lJ, cl. 3); "puhlijkc" for "puhlic" and "judgen" for 
"judges" (art. II,* 2, cl. 2); "trial" for "trial" (art. III,* 2, cl. 2); and "corruptie van hloed" 
for "corruption of hlood" (art. IlL* 3, cl. 2). U.S. CONST. (Dutch), supra note 1. 
7lJ. U.S. CONST. (German), supra note I; I DIPPEL, supra note I, at 64 n.l. 
XO. I DIPPEL, supra note I, at M n.l. 
X 1. !d. 
X2. If the German translator used a dictionary, it was likely outdated at the time of 
translation since some of the words he chose were antiquated. The translator's choices 
were compared to: TilE ENGLISII CELLARIUS; OR A DICTIONARY ENGLISH AND 
GERMAN CONTAINING THE EN<iLISII WORDS IN THEIR ALPHABETICAL ORDER AND 
DERIVATION (17nX); JOliN BARTHOLOMEW ROGLER, A DICTIONARY ENGLISH, 
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some evidence that allows one to conclude that he was a German 
native speaker: his word use is elevated, and especially when it 
comes to more technical terms he seems not to have consulted a 
dictionary, since it is mostly in these cases when his chosen words 
are far from what the dictionaries of the time would have listed. 
Some of his vocabulary however seems to be dated, again 
especially when it comes to technical terms of law and commerce. 
In one curious instance, he even uses a word that was only 
common in a very few regions in Germany.s' There is much more 
than a basic knowledge of grammar present, ~4 although the 
translator often chooses to ignore it when it comes into conflict 
with his verbatim, meta phrasing style. ss Yet despite the 
translator's command of German grammar, he makes some errors 
that would be surprising for a native speaker. For example, he 
sometimes translates "for" as "vor," even though the correct translation 
GERMAN AND FRENCH CONTAINING NOT ONLY TilE ENCiLISH WORDS IN THEIR 
ALPHABETICAL ORDER, TOGETHER WITH THEIR SEVERAL SIGNIFICATIONS; BUT ALSO 
THEIR PROPER ACCENT, PHRASES, FIGURATIVE SPEECH, IDIOMS, AND PROVERBS, BY 
MR. CHRISTIAN LUDWIG NOW CAREFULLY REVISITED, CORRECTED, AND 
THROUGHOUT AUGMENTEO WITH MORE THAN 12,000 WOROS, TAKf N OUT OF 
SAMUEL JOHNSON'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY AND OTHERS (3d l:d., Leipzig, 1763); 
VOLLSTANDIGES W<)RTERBUCII OER ENGLISCIIEN SPRACHE FOR DIE DEUTSCHEN 
NACH DEM NEUESTEN UND BESTEN HOLFSMITTTELN MIT RICHTIG BEZEICHNETER 
AUSSPRACHE EINES JEDEN WORTES BEARBEITET VON JOIIANNES EBERS ... (Leipzig, 
Johann Gottloh Immanuel Brcitkopf, Sohn und Compagnie 17l.l4); A COMPLEAT 
ENGLISH-GERMAN, GERMAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY THE FIRST VOLUME CONTAINING 
THE ENGLISH-GERMAN PART, HEREIN NOT ONLY TilE WORDS TO BE MET WITH IN 
OTHER DICTIONARIES, MAY BE FOUND, BUT ALL EXPRESSIONS OF NATURAL HISTORY, 
HUSBANDRY, MARINE, MERCHANDISE; THE LAW AND ITS COURTS TilE VULGAR 
TONGUE AND PROVINCIALISMS ARE INSERTED BY JOHN CIIRISTIAN FLICK (Hamhurg, 
1H03); A NEW ENGLISH-GERMAN AND GERMAN-ENGLISII DICTIONARY CONTAINING 
ALL TIIOESE WORDS IN GENERAL USE, DESIGNATING THF; VARIOUS PARTS OF SPEECH 
IN BOTH LANGUAGE WITH THE GENDERS AND PLURALS OF THE GERMAN NOUNS. 
COMPETED FROM THE DICTIONARIES OF LLOYD, NOHOEN, FL()GEL, AND SPORSCHIL IN 
Two VOLUMES (Philadelphia, George W. Mentz & Son 1H3:'i). Thl: latter is a more recent 
dictionary, hut since there was a custom to integrate earlier dictionaries of other authors 
into one's own dictionary, these later, more extensive, cckctic dictionaries arc an 
important source for earlier usc. 
X3. The translator uses the word "zwccn," which is the mak variant of "two," which 
is only common in some regions of Germany. It could however also he a typo ("zwccn" 
instead of "zwcicn"), hut the grammatical case and the gender match hctter in the case of 
"zwccn." 
X4. The translator's command of German is on display when using the correct 
gl:nitivc case; the correct position of the vcrh and auxiliary verh is also frequently chosen-
something non-native speakers often have difficulty with. 
X). Mctaphrasc is the word-for-word, line-for-line rendering of a text, as contrasted 
with paraphrase. See Lessig, supra note 62, at lll.l3-l.l4 (citing WILLIAM FROST, DRYDEN 
AND TilE ART OF TRANSLATION I (ll.l:'i:'i) (citations omitted)). 
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would be "ftir." 
Whether the translator was a lawyer or legal scholar is 
unclear. On the one hand, this seems doubtful since it is here 
where his German vocabulary occasionally fails.x1, On the other 
hand he is willing to paraphrase and extensively explain legal 
terminology that juridical laymen might fail to understand. For 
example, "naturalization" is paraphrased as "Ertheilung des 
Biirgerrechts" ("the granting of a citizen's right"), although a 
German cognate, "Naturalisation" existed at the time.K7 "Letters 
of Marque and Reprisal" is also imperfectly paraphrased, as "sich 
zu verteidigen und Repressalien zu gebrauchen, zu ertheilen" 
("authorizations to defend oneself and to use reprisals").xx "Bill 
of Attainder or ex post facto Law" is rewritten in the German 
translations: "No Law, that declares someone guilty without 
forensic conviction (court decision), or that will be made after the 
deed [has been] committed and that declares someone guilty, shall 
be made. ,xlJ The phrase "work Corruption of Blood" is explained 
as "soU sich tiber die Anverwandten erstrecken" ("shall extend to 
its relatives"). 90 
What is contradictory in the German translation is that 
despite the translator's general verbatim style, his habit of using 
cognates even in cases where this rather hinders understanding, 
and his close adherence to the structure of the original draft even 
when it comes to the sentence structure, he is also occasionally 
willing, without apparent cause, to depart from his closer 
translation, paraphrasing and choosing more ill-fitting words 
when closer ones (even cognates) were available. His attempt to 
keep the sentence structure of the original text and at the same 
time to obey the most basic rules of German grammar creates 
monstrous hybrids that, especially when it cornes to longer 
passages, are hard to understand even for a Gerrnan reader. In 
rare occasion, the translated sentence is distorted so severely that 
Xh. In the late 1700s, constitutions were a relatively new idea in Ciermany, as they 
were mainly a product of the Enlightenment. Most of the German constitutions did not 
come into effect until the early nineteenth century, which might explain some of the 
translator's verbal clumsiness when describing a democratic kgislativc process. There was 
also a persistent tradition of using Latin instead of German technical terms in the kgal 
context. 
X7. 
XX. 
WJ. 
90. 
lJ .S. CON ST. ( ( Ierman ), supra note I, art. I, * X, cl. 4. 
!d. art. I, * l-<. cl. II. 
!d. art. I, * lJ, cl. J. 
!d. art. III,* J, cl. 2. 
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the meaning can only be reconstructed by using the surrounding 
context. These observations, as well as the fact that the translator 
does not seem concerned about whether using a cognate is the 
best choice from a semantic perspective, might indicate laziness 
or a need for expediency as a cause to the translation's 
peculiarities; it must have been simpler to use cognates, translate 
line by line, sentence by sentence, half-sentence by half-sentence, 
and occasionally adjust the grammar to the German rules, than to 
change the sentence structure in a way to facilitate understanding. 
That time pressure or laziness affected the translation is further 
supported by his permitting the monstrous sentences he created 
to remain in the translation, as well as the fact that some of the 
more ill-fitting word-choices he made might be the result of failing 
to consult a dictionary. On the other hand, there seemed to be a 
willingness to explain some hard-to-understand legal terms 
extensively and adequately, and by this make these parts of the 
Constitution understandable for the general public. Both his 
consistency as well as his inconsistencies are noteworthy; they 
have to be taken in account when the translator's choices are used 
to interpret the original meaning of the English original. 
A. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
English German Dutch 
To regulate Commerce Die Handclschaft mit Om de koopmanschap te 
with foreign Nations, auswartigen Nationen, und regulceren met 
and among the several untcr den vcrschiedenen huitenlandschc natien, en 
States, and with the Staaten und mit den lndianer onder de onderscheiden 
Indian Trihes .... Stammen, einzurichten .... staaten, alsook met de 
lndiaansche volken.:n .... 
One of the most heated debates in constitutional 
interpretation concerns the scope of power granted to Congress 
under the Commerce Clause. In the past several decades, the 
Supreme Court has considered whether this clause grants 
Congress the power to mandate that every person acquire health 
insurance, 91 to criminalize growing marijuana for one's own 
!)J. See Nat'l Fed'n of lndep. Bus. v. Sehelius, 1]2 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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private consumption, 92 to criminalize certain acts of violence 
against women,'n and to enact higher penalties for carrying a gun 
near a school. 94 In each of these cases, the question before the 
courts was whether Congress's law constituted a permissible 
regulation of commerce or whether Congress had acted beyond 
the scope of its limited powers. 
Two of the more popular interpretations of the clause are 
represented by the work of Randy Barnett and Jack Balkin. 
Barnett views the original meaning of the clause as instantiating a 
notably limited power. In 2001, he canvased a wide variety of 
Founding-era documents including contemporary dictionaries, 
records of the constitutional conventions, the Federalist Papers, 
and early judicial interpretations of the Commerce Clause.95 He 
concluded that, although the term 'commerce' had a variety of 
meanings, in the context of the constitutional clause, commerce 
"means the trade or exchange of goods (including the means of 
transporting them)."% Barnett also concluded the verb "to 
regulate" meant "'to make regular'- that is, to specify how an 
activity may be transacted- when applied to domestic commerce, 
but also included the power to make 'prohibitory regulations' 
when applied to foreign trade. ,,n 
Jack Balkin maintains that a broader understanding of 
'commerce' is appropriate. He argues that "[t]o have commerce 
with someone meant to converse with them, mingle with them, 
associate with them or trade with them .... The contemporary 
meanings of intercourse and commerce are far narrower than their 
eighteenth-century meanings." 9K "If we want to capture the 
original meaning of 'commerce,' we must stop thinking primarily 
in terms of commodities. We must focus on the ideas of 
interaction, exchange, sociability, and the movement of persons 
that business (in its older sense of being busy or engaged in 
affairs) exemplifies. "99 
92. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. I (2005). 
93. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 5W\ (2000). 
Y4. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
95. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 61-\ 
U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 112~30, 132~35, 139-40 (20lll). 
96. !d. at 146; see also id. at 112~30 (describing the meaning of commerce in a variety 
of sources from the Founding-era and later periods). 
97. !d. at 146. 
91-\. JACK BALKIN, LIVING 0RICJINALISM 149 (2011 ). 
99. !d. at 151. 
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The German translation seems to reflect a midpoint between 
Barnett and Balkin's interpretations. When translating 
"Commerce" the translator had a number of choices: 
'Commercium,'ml 'Kaufmannschaft,' 'Handel,' 'Handlung,' and 
'Handelschaft.' He chose the last, 'Handelschaft,' a term that at 
the time already had become outmoded. 101 Both Kruenitz, 102 an 
eighteenth-century encyclopedia edited between 1773 and 1858 
and Adelung, 103 an eighteenth-century German critical dictionary 
edited between 1793 and 1810, define 'Handelschaft' as the 
business of exchanging goods with the purpose of profit. 
The root word of 'Handelschaft' is 'Handel,' which in its 
general meaning was very close to the English 'handling.' 
However, when used in the context of commerce, 'Handel' was 
understood "to broadly comprise any activity which creates a 
noteworthy change in an object" 104 so long as the activity was 
directed to profit. 105 In its common use, however, the term was 
usually limited "to (ex-)change of property." 10(, Used as a 
100. "[D[as Commercium" or "das Kommerz" (the latter rather referring to 
covenants or contracts in general)- which denotes the traffic of goods in general, and 
therefore is often understood as synonymous to "Handel." However, 'Handel' appears to 
he used much less frequently. See CiOETIIE-WORTERBlJCH, HG. V. DI,:R BERLIN-
BRANDENBlJRGISCHEN AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAfTEN (llJ7X) (discussing 
"Kommerz'' and "Commercium"); see a/so I JOHANN CHRISTOPH ADELlJNG, 
GRAMMATISCH-KRITISCHES WORTERBLJCH DER HOCIIDEUTSCHEN MUNDART MIT 
13ESTANDIGER YERGLEICHUNG DER LJBRIGEN MUNDARTEN, BESONDERS ABER DER 
OBERDEUTSCHEN. ZWEYTE, VERMEIIRTE UND VERBESSERTE AUSGABE at col. 1342 (2d 
ed. 1lJ70) (17lJ3-1 XO I). 
IOL According to ADELUNG, supra note 100, 'Handelschaft' was an antiquated term 
in the late eighteenth century. Instead, 'Handel' or 'Handlung' would he used. 
'Handelschaft' is also a peculiar choice hecause even contemporary English-German 
dictionaries list 'Handel' or 'Handlung' as the translation for 'commerce.' See supra note 
X2. 
102. JOHANN GEORG KRUENITZ: OECONOMISCIIE ENCYCLOPADIE ODER 
ALLGEMEINES SYSTEM DER LAND-, HAUS- UNO STAATS-WIRTHSCHAH: IN 
ALPHABETISCHER 0RDNUNG 1-242 (Berlin, Pauli 17X5). 
103. I ADELUNG, supra note 100. 
104. In the original commentary, "jede th~Hige auBere Yeranderung, Nahrung und 
Zeitliches Yerm()gen zu erwerhen." 2 ADELlJNG, supra note 100, col. l)46. 
105. /d. A different dictionary makes a distinction hetween 'Handel' and 'Handlung.' 
'Handel' refers to selling or huying goods hy merchants and hucksters whereas 'Handlung' 
is the term for the full field of the merchants' trade, also comprising the trade of hills. See 
generally S.J.E. STOSCH, PREDIGER ZU UJDERSDORI, YERSUCI-I IN RICHTIGER 
BESTIMMLJNG !-:!NIGER GLEICIIBEDEUTENDER WC)RTER DER DEUTSCH! N SPRACHE 
ZWEYTER THEIL. FRANKfURT ANDER 0DER, VFRLEGTS ANTON CiOTTFRIED BRAUNS 
WITTWE (Wien, Ehlen 1772). 
106. 2 ADELLJNG, supra note 100, col.l)46. Kruenitz understands 'Handel' in its more 
specific meaning as the "husiness of the merchant." See KRUENITZ, supra note 102. 
24 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 31:1 
collectivum, when the exchange of goods is someone's business, 
'Handel' and 'Handelschaft' -the term the German print uses-
become synonymous. 
From this evidence, we can draw the contours of the term's 
meaning. 'Handelschaft' denotes the full field of the merchants' 
trade, comprising exchanging goods for goods or bills, and 
possibly including the shipment and transportation of goods. 107 
This meaning also opens up the possibility that 'commerce' 
comprises the larger scope of actions and interactions of persons 
involved in business. 
The German translator could have made a different choice 
here: 'Kaufmannschaft,' the German cognate to the term the 
Dutch translation uses (' Koopmanschap'). This term would have 
had a more narrow meaning, particularly according to S.J.E. 
Stosch, an eighteenth-century clergyman who is known for his 
meditations on word use. Stosch limits 'Kaumfannschaft' solely to 
the exchange of goods for money, whereas 'Handelschaft' or 
'Handlung' is said to be the adequate terms for the broader scope 
of a merchant's action. Stosch also suggests that "Handelschaft" 
presupposes a business of a certain size, territorial scope, and 
professionalism. 10x Nonetheless, often, the terms 'Handelschaft' 
and 'Kaufmannschaft' would be used synonymouslly. 109 
It is notable that an even more broad term could have been 
used for 'commerce' -its German cognate "Commerz" or 
"Kommerz" (derived from the Latin "commercium" and in this 
form, "das Commercium," also found in German language). 110 
During the time of the translation, however, 'Commerz' and 
'Kommerz' were not much in use. 111 In an English-German 
107. STOSCII, supra note 105. 
lOX. !d. 
10!). I ADEUJN(I, supra note 100. Stoseh's treatment of the matter is also a sign of the 
terms' synonymy, as his task was to correctly tell words apart that were commonly used 
intcrchangcahly. STOSCH, supra note I 05. 
110. All three versions of the cognate had two meanings: a hroad one, meaning any 
intL:raction hL:twccn people, he it social or directed to profit; and a narrow one, referring 
to the exchange of goods. See 1 ADELlJNG, supra note 100; GOETHE-WC)RTERBlJCH, supra 
note 100. 
Ill. 'Commcrz' and 'Kommcrz' wcrL: not much in usc, and were even more rarely 
invoked when talking ahout interactions in general. This usage only later hccamc more 
frequent, prohahly duL: to their frequent usage as a title to denote more nohlc and 
distinguished people, as in "Commcrcicn-rath" or "Commcrz-ralh." TilE ENGLISH 
CELLARilJS, supra note X2, only lists "Handel", "Gcwcrhc" ("business") and 
"Bckanntschaft" ("acquaintance") as a translation of "commerce," hut not 
2016] FOUNDING-ERA TRANSLATIONS 25 
dictionary from 1800, Ebers defines 'commerce' as "the 
concourse/interaction of one with another," 112 expressing a view 
similar to Balkin's. However, the German translator did not 
choose this locution in his translation of the Constitution. 
De Ronde gestures at a more circumscribed understanding 
of 'commerce'; his choice of 'koopmanschap' points towards the 
actions of 'koopmanen' (merchants). However, while the German 
translator had a variety of choices in how to translate 'commerce,' 
De Ronde had fewer options. Although 'handelschap,' the Dutch 
cognate of the German 'Handelschaft' exists, it does not appear 
to have ever been in wide use. The word "koopmanschap" 
appears in nine places in Sewel's Compleat Dictionary English 
and Dutch, published in 1766, but "handelschap" is not found. 113 
The translations of 'regulate,' however, run in different 
directions. De Ronde chose a Dutch cognate of the English word. 
In Dutch, 'regulate' or 'reguleeren' means to subject to imposition 
of rules or control, or to supervise. 114 However, the German 
translator chose the verb 'einrichten,' a somewhat ambiguous 
term, which could mean any of: to establish something previously 
nonexistent, to furnish something existing, or to establish oneself 
somewhere. For comparison, the translator could have used the 
word 'regulieren,' meaning to subject something to rules or to 
control, now commonly used in the European Union. 
While the Dutch translation preserves a narrower notion of 
regulation as "making regular" or setting rules for, the German 
translation appears to allow the government to establish 
commerce where it might not have previously existed. It might be 
argued that the Commerce Clause ruling in the constitutional 
challenge to the Affordable Care Act, which concerned whether 
Congress had the power to force individuals to engage in 
commerce, might have had a different result if the German 
"Commcrcium." See also GOETHE-WORTERBUCII, supra note 100 ("Kommerz" & 
"Commercium"); I ADELUNG, supra note 100, col. 1342 ("Commercium"). 
112. EBERS, supra note X2, at 23. 
113. EGBERT BUYS, A COMPLEAT DICTIONARY ENGLISH AND DUTCII TO WHICH 
IS ADDED A GRAMMAR, FOR BOTH LANGUAGES, ORIGINALLY COMPILED BY WILLIAM 
SEWEL; BUT NOW, NOT ONLY REVIEWED, AND MORE THAN TilE HALF PART 
AUGMENTED, YET ACCORDING TO THE MODERN SPELLING, ENTIRI LY IMPROVED BY 
EGBERT BUYS (Amsterdam, Kornclis de Veer 1766). 
114. Specifically, "reguleeren" means "ltJo make regular or orderly" as in "to 
regulate the course of a river," and also "to subject to legal decisions and rules." See 
Reguleeren, VAN DALE DICTIONARY, www.vandale.nl (last visited Oct. 13, 2015). 
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translation were the dispositive text. 
B. THE PROGRESS CLAUSE 
Progress Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
English German Dutch 
To promote the Progress Die Aufnahme dcr Om den voordgang van 
of Science and useful Arts Wissenschaften und wectenschap en nuttige 
by securing for limited ntitzlichen Ktinste konsten te hevordcren 
Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective 
dadurch zu hemrdern, 
dal3 er denen Autoren 
und Erfindern das 
door (voor hepaalde Lyden) 
aan de autheurs, en 
uitvinders te vcrzeekcren 
Writings 
Discoveries .... 
and ausschlicsscndc Recht zu hct uit sluitcnd rcgt tot 
ihrcn 
Schriften 
rcspcctivcn hare hysondcrc schriftcn 
und en ontdckkingcn .... 
Entdeckungcn fur cine 
gewissc Zeit 
versichcrt .... 
The Progress Clause grants Congress the power to create 
copyrights and patents. The text runs in parallel; Congress is 
granted the rights to "promote the Progress of Science ... , by 
securing for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to 
their ... Writings" and to "promote the Progress of ... useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their ... Discoveries." 115 
The general consensus is that "science" referred to learning 
or knowledge. 1111 Although the phrase "useful A.rts" is more 
115. See Giles S. Rich, The "Fxc!usive Right" Since Aristotle, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 217, 
224 (2004) ("]The clause] is two subjects-patents and copyrights-rolled into one!;] 
'Science' is to he promoted by copyright and 'useful Arts' by patents."); Giles Sutherland 
Rich, My Favorite Things, 35 IDEA I, 2 (llJlJ4) (stating that "li It was 4 uitc clearly intended 
by the authors of the Constitution that copyright, not patents, was intended to promote 
science, and the province of rights granted to inventors respecting their 'Discoveries' was 
to promote the 'useful Arts"'); Lawrence B. Solum, Congress's Power to Promote the 
Progress of Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. I, 11-12 (2002). 
116. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 1X6, 243 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 
EDWARD WALTERSCIIFID, THE NATURE OF TilE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A 
STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 125-26 (2002)) {arguing the purpose of the Clause is 
to promote "the progress of 'Science'- by which word the Framers meant learning or 
knowledge"); Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, X3 S. CAL. L. REV. 7lJ7, X1lJ (2010) 
("Intellectual property historians have contended that, at the time of the lflraming, 'the 
Progress of Science' meant learning or knowledge (referring to the goal of copyright)!.]"); 
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ambiguous, scholars generally agree that it referred to 
technology,"7 although Edward C. Walterscheid interprets 
"useful Arts" to mean "helpful or valuable trades." 11 x 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court "has shied away from fully 
defining what constitutes 'the Progress of Science' or 'useful 
Arts.'" 11 l) The Progress Clause notably omits any mention of 
protecting the fine arts, such as sculpture, poetry, painting, and 
music, which are clearly copyrightable under current statutory 
law. 
There is a paucity of Founding-era interpretive data on the 
Progress Clause. Although Thomas Jefferson wrote at some 
length about patents and copyrights, he was not present at the 
convention in Philadelphia when the Constitution was drafted. 120 
There is no record from the Convention of any debate concerning 
the clause. 121 Indeed, aside from a brief discussion of the clause in 
Federalist 43, 122 there is very little evidence of how the founders 
Rich, My Favorite Things, supra note 115, at 2. 
117. See Margaret Chon, Postmodern "Progress": Reconsidering the Copyright and 
Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 115 (1993) ("The 'useful Arts,' what we would now 
call applied science or technology, were often distinguished from 'fine arts,' then as now 
denoting art that is more aesthetic than practical, such as poetry, painting, sculpture, and 
the like."); Lee, supra note 116, at Xl9; PeterS. Mcneil, Forty Years of Wondering in the 
Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised /,and, h3 STAN. L. REV. 12X9, 1293 (2011) 
(stating that "lajlthough the Framers did not expressly define the term ·useful Arts,' usage 
at the time indicates that it related to trades utilizing what we would today call 
'technology.' Several !Founding-era sources! support the textual inference that "useful 
Arts" concerned craft, trade, and industrial activities .... " (internal citations omitted) and 
"ltlhe phrase 'useful Arts' was understood in contradistinction to the eighteenth-century 
terms 'polite,' 'liheral,' and 'fine' arts-which related to aesthetic and philosophical 
pursuits."); see also Karl B. Lutz, Patents and 5!cience: A Clarification of the J>atent Clause 
ofthe U.S. Constitution, IX GEO. WASil. L. REV. 50,54 (194lJ). 
11 X. Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: 
The Background and Origin of the lnte//ectua/ Property Clause of the United States 
Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. I, 52 ( 1994 ). 
11lJ. Lee, supra note 117, at X llJ. 
120. RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN, THOMAS JEFFFRSON 71 (2005). 
121. See Edward C. Waltcrscheid, To Promote the Progress of ,\'cience and Useful 
Arts: The Anatomy of a Congressional Power, 43 IDEA I, 2-3 (2002). 
122. Madison wrote: 
The utility of this power will scarcely he questioned. The copyright of authors has 
heen solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to he a right of the common law. The 
right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to helong to the inventors. The 
puhlic good fully coincides in hoth cases with the claims of individuals. The States 
cannot separately make effectual provision for either of the cases, and most of 
them have anticipated the decision on this point, hy laws passed at the instance 
of Congress. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison). Madison's reference to copyright heing a right 
at common law in Great Britain was likely a reference to Millar v. Taylor, ( 17olJ) 4 Burr. 
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and contemporary readers of the Progress Clause interpreted it. 
The Dutch and German translations of the Progress Clause 
tend to comport with the dominant academic understanding of 
the phrase "science and useful Arts." "Science" was rendered 
"Wissenschaften" ("sciences") in German and "wetenschap," 
meaning science, knowledge, or scholarship, in l)utch. "Useful 
Arts" in German became "ni.itzliche Ki.inste," indicating the skills 
and techniques of industry and craft, and standing in contrast to 
"schone Ki.inste" ("the beautiful arts"), which included painting 
and poetry. The Dutch translation was similarly rendered "nuttige 
konsten"- the useful arts, which excluded the visual arts. 
Other language in the Progress Clause has been the subject 
of judicial scrutiny. The Progress Clause's phrase "for limited 
Times" was at the center of a constitutional challenge to the 
Copyright Term Extension Act ("CTEA") in the 2003 decision 
Eldred v. Ashcroft. 123 Eldred challenged the CTEA for extending 
the copyright term by twenty years, arguing that this extension 
violated the constitutional requirement that copyrights be granted 
only "for limited Times." The Supreme Court held that even 
though the CTEA extended the copyright term by twenty years, 
the period of copyright protection still comported with the 
Constitution's requirements because the term was not infinite. 124 
The Dutch and German translations suggest a meaning of 
"for limited Times" which may slightly differ frorn the Supreme 
Court's interpretation. De Ronde translates the phrase to "voor 
bepaalde tyden"- "for some time" or "for certain times." 
Similarly, the German is "fi.ir eine gewisse Zeit"- "for a period of 
time" or "for a sure/certain time." 125 Both suggest that in addition 
to not being infinite, the term of a patent or copyright may have 
to be a specific, particular length of time, not necessarily alterable 
2303 (K.B). The holding that there was a copyright at common law in England was 
reversed five years later in Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) I Eng. Rep. ~:37 (H.L.). See Malia 
Pollack, The Owned l'uhlic Domain, 22 HASTINGS COMM./ENT. L.J. 265, 2X4 n.Y2 (2000). 
123. 537 U.S. IX6. 
124. !d. at 201-\-0lJ. 
125. The German 'gewiss' presupposes, as the Latin 'certus,' that the time in some 
way is sure (or for the Cierman, that the time is "known," which is the literal translation of 
"gewiB"). 'Gewiss,' as a participle that can hoth serve as an adverh man adjective, stems 
from 'wissen,' ("to know"). In this regard, Grimm can state that only mathematics is 
"gewiss" ("certain") as a science. Kruenitz also uses 'gewiss' in the meaning of 'steady,' as 
in requiring an artist to have a steady hand ("cine gewisse hand"). See KRUENITZ, supra 
note 102. 
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in the future~ although one could argue that even an extended 
term was still for a certain time, and that the certain time had 
merely changed. In this vein~ the term 'gewisse' is also colloquially 
used in the sense of "some time" as opposed to "an infinite time~" 
in which case an exactly determined or determinable duration is 
not presupposed. 
C. THE NECESSARY & PROPER CLAUSE 
Necessary & Proper Clause~ Art. I,§ 8~ cl. 18. 
English 
To make all Laws which 
shall he necessary and 
proper for carrying into 
Execution the foregoing 
Powers, and all other 
Powers vested hy this 
Constitution in the 
Government of the United 
States, or m any 
Department or Officer 
thereof. 
German 
Aile Gesetze zu machen, 
die nMhig und erforderlich 
seyn werden, die 
vorhergehende und aile 
andere Gewalt, die kraft 
dieser V erfassung der 
Regierung der Vcreinigten 
Staaten oder einem 
Department oder Beam ten 
dersclhen ntheilct 
worden, m Ausuhung zu 
hringen. 
Dutch 
Om aile wellen te maken, 
die noodig en he4uaam 
zullcn zyn om ter uitvoer te 
hrengen de voorgaande 
magten en aile andere 
machten, gevestigt hy 
deese Constitutie in het 
government van de 
Yereenigde Staaten of in 
eenig department of 
officiant daarven. 
The question of what laws are "necessary and proper" for 
Congress to make harkens all the way back to the ratification 
debates. Anti-Federalists "pejoratively dubbed the Necessary & 
Proper Clause 'the Sweeping Clause~' arguing that it granted 
dangerously broad and ill-defined powers" to the Federal 
Government. 126 In contrast~ "Federalist supporters of the 
Constitution ... insisted that the Necessary and Proper Clause 
was not an additional freestanding grant of power~ but merely 
made explicit what was already implicit in the grant of each 
enumerated power." 127 
12fl. Gary Lawson et al., Raiders of the Lost Clause: Excavating the Buried 
Foundations of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY 
AND PROPER CLAUSE 1, 1-2 (Gary Lawson ct al. eds., 2010). 
127. RANDY E. BARNElT, RESTORING THF LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 155 (2004). The dehates at the Philadelphia Convention 
30 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 31:1 
Although Mark Graber pessimistically clairned, "no one, 
including the framers, knows the point of the phrase 'necessary 
and proper,"' 12K Robert Natelson argues that contemporary 
documents indicate that "necessary and proper" was a legal term 
of art frequently used in agency instruments when granting 
incidental powers to one's fiduciaries. 129 Indeed, during the 
ratification debates, Federalists wrote as though "proper" 
indicated that laws must accord with the governrrtent's fiduciary 
duty to the people. 130 
The question of what laws were "necessary" quickly became 
salient after the Founding, when each branch of government 
considered whether Congress had the power to charter a bank. 
James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and Edmond Randolph 
interpreted "necessary'' in a narrow manner.u' In contrast, 
provide little guidance to the Clause's meaning. The Necessary and Proper Clause was 
added to the Constitution hy the ''Committee on Detail" and never 1.khatcd prior to the 
Convention's final adoption of the Constitution. !d. 
12X. Mark A. C!raher, Unnecessary and Unintelligihle, 12 CONST. COMMENTARY 167, 
16X(IYY5). 
12Y. Rohert Natclson argues the clause "tracks the language found in many 
Founding- and pre-Founding-era private agency instruments, which used 'necessary and 
proper' or some equivalent to give fiduciary agents incidental powers heyond those 
explicitly derived in the instruments." Lawson ct al., supra note 126, at 6. See generally 
Rohcrt G. Natelson. The !.ega/ Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in TilE 
ORIGINS OF TilE NECFSSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 52 (Gary Lawson ct al. cds., 2010). 
Corporate charters also frequently contained "[c]lauscs similar to the Necessary and 
Proper Clause ... to ensure that an organization with limited powers and purposes would 
not he frustrated in the essential conduct of its governmentally assigned activities hut still 
would he confined to its assigned functions." !d. at 7. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, The 
Corporate Law Background of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in THE ORIGINS OF THE 
NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 144 (Gary Lawson ct al. eds., 2010). Natelson 
concluded that, in agency instruments, a provision using the word 'necessary' 
"communicated the grant of incidental powers, hut no more or less." Natclson, supra, at 
76. British administrative law also contemplated "'incidental'" power~, as contrasted with 
'"principal'" powers. See William Baucle, Rethinking the Federal f~minent Domain Power, 
122 YALE L.J. 173X, 1750 (2013 ). Empowering the agent "to act in a 'proper' manner would 
signal that the agent was hound hy fiduciary responsihilities." Natelson, supra, at XO. In a 
governmental context, "the founders frequently used the term 'proper' to refer to the 
ohligation of each government hranch to respect its jurisdictional houndaries." !d. at XY-
YO (citing Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A 
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (IYY3)). The records 
of the Constitutional Convention generally support the interpretation that the founders 
understood "necessary and proper" hy reference to its contemporaneous legal usage. 
Natelson, supra, atY3. 
130. Natelson, supra note 12lJ, at IOX-OY. 
131. See BARNEIT, supra note 127, at 15X-66; Edmund Randolph, Opinion of 
Edmund Randolph, in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF TilE BANK OF 
THE UNITED STATES: INCLUDIN(i THE ORIGINAL BANK OF NORTH AMERICA XY (M. St. 
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Alexander Hamilton took the view that "necessary often means 
no more than needful, requisite, incidental, useful or conducive 
to." 132 
When Chief Justice John Marshall ruled on the 
constitutionality of the Bank of the United States in 1819, he sided 
with Hamilton. To Marshall, "necessary" meant "convenient."133 
Although Marshall weaved flexibility into the notion of necessity, 
he suggested that "necessary" laws must still remain incidental in 
character. 134 Marshall went on to suggest that the term 'proper' 
limited Congress to passing laws actually, rather than pre-
textually, aimed at achieving the ends listed among the 
enumerated powers. 135 
Clair Clarke & D.A. Hall cds., Gales & Seaton 1X32) (hereinafter LEGISLATIVE AND 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY). Madison stated, "]The clause's] meaning must ... he limited 
to means necessary to the end, and incident to the nature of specified powers." The 
Founders' Constitution: James Madison, The Bank Bill, /louse of Representatives, UNIV. 
OF CHICAGO, http://prcss-puhs.uchicago.edu/foundcrs/print_documcnts/a 1_X_1 Xsl).html 
(last visited Oct. 1A, 2015). Jefferson similarly interpreted the Constitution to "allow]] only 
the means which arc 'necessary,' not those which arc merely convenient for effecting the 
enumerated powers .... ]T]hc ]C]onstitution restrained ]Congress] to ... those means, 
without which the grant of power would he nugatory." Thomas Jefferson. Opinion of 
Thomas Jefferson: Secretary of State, on the Same Subject (Feb. 15, 1791 ), in LEGISLATIVE 
AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY l)3. 
132. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion of Alexander 1/amilton, on the Constitutionality 
of a National Bank, in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY l)7 (1X32). 
133. Marshall wrote: 
I I ]n the common affairs of the world, or in approved authors, we find that 
I 'necessary'] frequently imports no more than that one thing is convenient, or 
useful, or essential to another. To employ the means necessary to an end, is 
generally understood as employing any means calculated to produce the end, and 
not as hcing confined to those single means, without which the end would he 
entirely unattainahle. 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 31(), 413-14 (1Xll)). 
134. Part of Marshall's rationale for holding the hank constitutional was that the 
power to charter a hank was not "a great suhstantivc and independent power, which cannot 
he implied as incidental to other powers, or used as a means of executing them." 
McCulloch, 17U.S. at 411. This conclusion was consistent with Randolph's claim that "]t]o 
he necessary is to he incidental." Randolph, supra note 13 I, at Xl). William Baudc has 
recently argued that the Necessary and Proper Clause permits the government to exercise 
incidental powers hut not, in the language of Madison, 'great' powers. See Baudc, supra 
note 12l), at 174<}-55. 
135. See BARNETT, supra note 127, at IX4-Xl). Marshall wrote: 
]S ]ound construction of the constitution must allow to the national legislature 
that discretion, with respect to the means hy which the powers it confers arc to 
he carried into execution, which will cnahk that hody to perform the high duties 
assigned to it, in the manner most hcndicial to the people. Let the end he 
legitimate, let it he within the scope of the constitution, and all means which arc 
appropriate, which arc plainly adapted to that end, which arc not prohihitcd, hut 
consist with the kttcr and spirit of the constitution, arc constitutional. 
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The Dutch and German translations of "necessary" denote a 
stronger requirement than Marshall's notion of convenience, just 
as the plain text of the English does. De Ronde used the word 
'noodig,' meaning "needed'' or "demanded." The German 
translator chose 'nothig,' 131' also meaning "necessary." 
The translation of "proper" provides more insight into the 
minds of the translators. In the Dutch translation, "proper" 
became "bequaam," spelled 'bekwaam' in modern Dutch, 
meaning competent, able, or capable. 137 For a law to be "noodig 
en bequaam," it would have to be necessary and capable of 
achieving the end it sought. This suggests an interpretation of 
"necessary and proper" where laws passed under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause are constitutional when they are capable of 
solving the problems or addressing the situations the enumerated 
powers of Congress were designed for. 
The German translation used "erforderlich" for proper, 
meaning required, requisite to have happen, or "what the 
situation demands." The translated phrase as a whole, "nothig 
und erforderlich," is thus somewhat redundant--laws must be 
"necessary and required." This is a surprising translation because 
in the German legal vocabulary there was a non-redundant analog 
to the Necessary and Proper Clause that could be found in 
contemporary texts: "notwendig und angemessen." 
"Angemessen" would mean "proper" in the Aristotelian sense, 
ensuring not only the effectiveness of the means, but also that the 
means are limited by the goal. In other words, it would not be 
"angemessen" for one to crack a nut with a sledgehammer. The 
redundant form the translator uses is not necessarily wrong, and 
might be understood to have a rhetorical function instead: it 
emphasizes that the power given is essentially restricted. 
Neither translation evinces an understanding of Natelson's 
notion of agency or a sense that "necessary and proper" laws are 
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421. 
D6. "[N[<ithig" stems from the noun "Not," meaning "(strong) need" or 
"emergency." 
137. 'l3ckwaam' outpaces 'hcquaam' 3X to 2 in appearances in Scwel's Dictionary, 
indicating perhaps De Ronde's old-fashioned tendencies. See BUYS, supra note 113. His 
uphringing in Geldcrland likely contrihutcd to his non-standard spellings and regional 
vocahulary. The inventory of his estate indicates that De Ronde read almost exclusively 
17th century Dutch religious texts. Rensselaer County Historical Society [New York[ 
Rensselaer County Surrogate ( 'ourt records, inventory of the estate of Lamhcrt 
DcRondc. 16 Fchruary 1796. 
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merely laws incidental to laws clearly within the powers of 
Congress. This may be because the translators were unfamiliar 
with the phrase "necessary and proper" as a term of art. 
Nonetheless, the view that a proper law is one which is not pre-
textually related to an enumerated power is somewhat evoked by 
the translations "erforderlich" and "bequaam," particularly if one 
understands 'bequaam' as indicating that a law is only proper if it 
is capable of advancing the ends Congress is permitted to. 
Justice Marshall contrasted the language of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause with the language prohibiting states from 
laying imposts of duties. That language states, "No State shall ... 
lay any Imposts of Duties ... except what may be absolutely 
necessary for executing its inspection laws." 13K Because the phrase 
"absolutely necessary" appeared elsewhere in the Constitution, 
Marshall claimed the "necessity" required by the Necessary and 
Proper Clause "need not be absolute" and that the term 
"necessary" could be taken "in its ordinary grammatical sense" 
and "used in a sense more or less strict." Lw 
The terms "necessary" and "absolutely necessary" retain 
their difference in degree in the German and Dutch translations. 
In German, "absolutely necessary" became "unumganglich 
nothig" (uncircumventably necessary). More literally, 
'unumganglich' means "unable to be walked around." In Dutch, 
it became "absolut noodzakelyk" (absolutely necessary). 
De Ronde curiously chose a very close synonym for 'noodig' in 
this clause, 'noodzakelyk'. The terms are very often used 
interchangeably, but to the extent that there are shades of 
difference in meaning, 'noodig' is something which is demanded 
or asked for, like a favor, but something that is 'noodzakelyk' is 
required, like military service. 
13X. U.S. CONST. art. I,~ 10, cl. 2. 
13lJ. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 3XX. 
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0. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 
Privileges & Immunities Clause~ Art. IV~§ 2~ cl. 1. 
English German Dutch 
The Citizens of each Die Burger cines jcdcn De hurgcrs van elk staat 
Stale shall he entitled to Staats sollen zu allen sullen regt hehhcn tot aile 
all Privileges and Vorrcchten und voorregten en vryhceden 
Immunities of Citizens Frcyheiten der BUrger in van hurgcrs in de 
in the several den verschicdenen onderschydcne staaten. 
States. Staalen hcrechtigt seyn. 
Writ of Habeas Corpus~ Art. I~ § 9~ cl. 2 
English German Dutch 
The privilege of the Writ of Das Recht des Hahcas De privilegic van het writ 
Hahcas Corpus shall not he Corpus Bcfehls soli nicht van haheas corpus, zal 
suspended .... aufgehohcn werden .... nict opgeschorl 
worden .... 
There are two frequently-encountered interpretations of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause. The first is that the clause 
merely prevents discrimination between residents and 
nonresidents of a state- ''the Clause guarantees that non-resident 
citizens will have merely the same privileges and itnmunities that 
are guaranteed to resident citizens." 140 The second is that the 
Clause "guarantees a uniform set of substantive privileges and 
immunities to citizens of the United States no matter what rights 
a particular state constitution might contain." 141 
140. Douglas (1. Smith, The J>rivileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2: 
Precursor to Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment, 34 SAN DIEC'O L. REV. X09, X90 
(1997). 
141. /d. See also Chester James Antieau, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the True 
Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
I, 5 (1967). The substantive view is perhaps most famously associaled with Corfield v. 
Coryell, No. 3,320, 6 F. Cas. 54() (C.C.E.D. Pa. IX23), written hy Justice Bushrod 
Washington while riding circuit. Justice Washington's interpretation of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause in Cor_field v. Coryell "was long considered the authoritative 
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause." David R. Upham, Corfield v. 
Coryell and the Privileges and Immunities of American Citizenship, x:, TEX. L. REV. 14X3, 
14X3 (2005). In Corfie/d, he claimed that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
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Supreme Court jurisprudence currently treats the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause as a non-discrimination clause, preventing 
the governments of a state from discriminating against citizens 
from other states. 142 Under this interpretation, the phrase 
"Privileges and Immunities" does not consist of specific 
protections of substantive rights, but rather requires that any 
"Privileges and Immunities" granted or recognized by a state are 
granted or recognized equally in citizens of that state and of other 
states. 
One textual question that persists amidst the debate about 
the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause concerns the 
meaning of terms 'privileges' and 'immunities.' Robert Natelson 
several states were "those privileges and immunities which arc, in their nature, 
fundamental; which hclong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which 
have, at all times, hccn enjoyed hy the citizens of the several states which compose this 
Union, from the time of their hccoming free, independent, and sovereign." Corfield, 6 F. 
Cas. at 551-52. Among the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states were: 
lplrotcction hy the government; the enjoyment of life and lihcrty, with the right 
to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and ohtain happiness 
and safety! I ... I tjhc right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in 
any other state! I ... to claim the hcncfit of the writ of hahcas corpus; to institute 
and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and 
dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes 
or impositions than arc paid hy the other citizens of the state .... 
/d. Many scholars understand Corfield as standing for the proposition that "the privileges 
and immunities protected under Article IV arc not those graciously accorded to its citizens 
hy a state of sojourn, hut the rights, privileges and immunities of citizens of the several or 
United States-the natural, fundamental rights of free men everywhere." Chester James 
Anticau, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning of the Privile!{es and Immunities 
Clause of Article Four, l) WM. & MARY L. REV. I, II (llJ67). See, e.g., JAMES H. KETTNER, 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 160X-IX70, at 25lJ-6() (llJ7X); Michael 
Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendmenls: Slaughter-
House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 7X5, XI6-1X (llJX2); see also MICHAEL KENT 
CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS 123-24 (1l)X6); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 6-34, 
at 52l) (2d cd. ll)XX). For a further discussion of these authors and others' interpretation of 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, sec Upham, supra, at 14X7, n.20. David Currie 
presents a different interpretation of Corfield-that the decision "concluded no more than 
that the clause allowed discrimination against an outsider if the right in question was not 
'fundamental."' DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE 
FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 17XlJ-IXXX, at 23lJ, n.l2 (1lJX5). Despite Corf'ield's prominence, 
it was in fact one of several decisions that interpreted the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
in a variety of ways. See Upham, supra, at 14lJX-1510. 
142. See Jon David Phcils, Defining the Scope of the Article Four Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, 54 lJ. CIN. L. REV. XX3, XX4-X5 (ll)Xfl). Note the history and 
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four of the U.S. 
Constitution differs strongly from the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
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argues these terms are far from inkblots 143 and arrives at the 
meaning of the terms 'privileges' and 'immunities·· by looking at 
the terms' historic usage. Privilege, as defined in a variety of legal 
dictionaries, tended to mean "(1) a benefit or advantage; 
(2) conferred by positive law; (3) on a person or place; 
( 4) contrary to what the rule would be in absence of the 
privilege." 144 Lay dictionaries reflected the sa1ne definition. 
Natelson concludes, "Nothing in these definitions identified 
privileges with natural rights or natural law. Nor did the 
definitions suggest that privileges were necessarily created, as 
some have asserted, by the English common law. On the contrary, 
the definitions suggest that privileges were departures from the 
usual course of common law." 145 Similarly, an immunity 
constituted "an exemption, otherwise contrary to law, given to a 
person or place by special grant." 146 Although "privileges and 
immunities" were considered grants from the government to 
particular, often small, classes of people under early English law, 
today several "privileges" and "immunities" could be seen as 
natural rights, such as the right to acquire and alienate land. 147 
De Ronde's translation of "privileges" to "voorregten" 
143. Natelson argues "'Privilege' was a legal term of art with a clear definition, 
elucidated hy a large body of Anglo-American case law and commentary. The same was 
true, in !some! degree. of 'immunity."' Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause. 4] GA. L. REV. 1117, 1122 (200Y). Natelson went on to 
criticize Justice Washington's view of Privileges and Immunities as failing to make sense 
on both its own terms and as a historical matter, and to note a varil:ty of other 
intnprctations of the clause: that the Clause protected a general right to travel, that the 
"privileges and immunities of citizenship" were the rights specifically enumerated in the 
Constitl\tion, and that "privileges and immunities" wne "the ancestral privileges of 
Englishmen- transferred to Americans through their colonial charters." !d. at 1126. See 
also David F. Forte & Ronald Rotunda, Privileges and lmmunilies Clause, in THE 
HERITAGE GUIDE TO TilE CONSTITUTION 26Y (Edwin Meese, Ill et al. eds., 2005) 
('"Privileges and immunities' constituted a summary of ancient righb of Englishmen that 
the colonists fought to maintain during the struggle against the mother country."); Michael 
Conant, Antimonopolv Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-
House Cases Re-f~xamined, 31 EMORY L.J. 7X5, XOY-15 (IYK2) (describing rights granted 
in colonial chartns and claiming that these "privileges and immunities" amounted to 
British constitutional limitations). Natelson rejects these intnpretations. 
144. Natelson, supra note 143, at I 130-] I. 
145. !d. at IB2. 
146. !d. at I BJ. Natelson concludes that the terms 'immunity' and 'privilege' 
effectively referred to the same legal concept. !d. at I BJ. "Because an immunity was a 
benefit, otherwise contrary to law, given to a person or place hy special grant, it was a 
privilege. A privilege to act in a certain way necessarily implied an 1.:xemption from the 
normal consequences of so acting-hence, an immunity." !d. at 1 B4. 
147. !d. at I BK-JY. 
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reflects the notion that privileges were benefits granted by the 
state, instead of rights. For "immunities," De Ronde uses 
"vryheden" (freedoms), a word that reflects a notion of natural 
liberty rather than a special grant by the state. Sewel's Dutch-
English Dictionary from 1766 attests that "voorrecht" is a special 
privilege, and that freedom (vryheid) is a more general term. 14x 
Where the term 'privilege' is used in Article 1, Section 9, clause 2, 
describing the "privilege of habeas corpus,'' De Ronde chooses 
the cognate "privilegie" to stand in for privilege. 
The German translator also gives a meaning to "privileges 
and immunities" that is not quite in accord with existing theories, 
but which is notably aligned with the meaning evoked in 
De Ronde's translation. For "privileges," he uses "Vorrechte," 
meaning a special benefit granted. But for "immunities,'' he uses 
"Freyheiten" (freedoms). "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus," however, becomes the right of habeas corpus- "Das 
Recht des Habeas Corpus," now equating "privilege" 
("Vorrecht") and the more modern "right" ("Recht"). 
E. NATURAL BORN CITIZEN 
Natural Born Citizen, Art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
English 
No person except a 
natural horn Citizen, or a 
Citizen of the United 
States, at the time of the 
Adoption of this 
Constitution, shall he 
eligihlc to the Office of 
President .... 
German 
Nicmand ausscr em 
gchorncr Burger, odcr 
dcr zu dcr Zeit, da dicsc 
Vcrfassung angcnommcn 
wird, cin Burger dcr 
Vcrcinigtcn Stattcn ist, 
soli zu dcm Amtc cines 
Prasidcntcn wahlfahig 
scyn .... 
Dutch 
Ciccn pcrsoon dan ccn 
ingcdmorcn hurgcr, of die 
ccn hurgcr 1s van de 
Vcrccnigdc Staatcn op 
den tyd can de adoptic van 
dccsc Constitutic, zal 
vcrkicshaar zyn tot hct 
officic van President .... 
Recent presidential elections have raised the question of 
what it means to be a "natural born Citizen" eligible to become 
President of the United States. The Republican presidential 
candidate in 2008, John McCain, was born to American parents in 
the Panama Canal Zone in 1936, while his father was on active 
14X. BUYS, supra note 113. 
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duty in the U.S. Navy. 149 Before McCain, a shadow was also cast 
on George Romney's attempt to win the Republican presidential 
nomination in 1968; Romney was born in Mexico to U.S. citizen 
parents. 150 
There are competing interpretations of the phrase "natural 
born Citizen." Gabriel Chin argues that to be a natural born 
citizen, one must be a citizen "at the moment of birth," whether 
or not that citizenship is acquired under the citizenship clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment or by Congressional statute. 151 A 
competing view is that one is only a natural born citizen if one is 
born within the United States. Under this view, a child who is born 
to American citizens abroad is naturalized at birth by statute and 
is not a natural born citizen. 152 Still another view holds that the 
citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not the right 
place to look for the definition of "natural born Citizen," as the 
Fourteenth Amendment was passed after the Constitution was 
adopted, and that the notion of "natural born Citizen" can be 
extracted from the common law. 153 
Larry Tribe and Ted Olson claim the "natural born Citizen" 
language contemplates the inclusion of children of American 
citizens, arguing that the clause was inspired by the British 
Nationality Act of 1730, which provided that children born abroad 
to "natural-born Subjects'' of the British crown were "natural-
born Subjects" themselves. 154 In Tribe and Olson's view, the 
Natural Born Citizen Clause tracks the existing understanding of 
natural born subjects in England, simply substituting the word 
"Citizen" for "Subject." 155 Larry Solum similarly looks to 
149. See, e.g., Gahricl J. Chin, Why Senator John McCain Cannot Be President, 107 
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS I, 2 (200X), http://rcpository.law.umich.edu/cgi/ 
vicwcontcnt.cgi'!articlc=IOX9 &contcxt=mlr_fi. Much of the dchatt: ahout John McCain 
concerned a statutory question of whether the Canal Zone was wilhin the "limits and 
jurisdiction" of the United States, which reaches issues hcyond the argument ahout the 
text or this clause. 
150. See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, McCain's Citizenship and Constitutional Method, 107 
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 42, 43 (200X), http://rcpository.law.umich.edu/cgi/ 
vicwcontcnt.cgi'!articlc= I OXo &contcxt=mlr_fi. 
151. Chin, supra note 149, at 2. 
152. See Chin, surmz note 149, at 5. 
153. !d. at lo. 
154. See British Nationality Act, 1730,4 Gco. 2, c. 21; Laurence H. Trihc & Theodore 
B. Olson, Opinion Letter, Presidents and Citizenship, 2 J.L. 509,510 (2012). 
155. Trihc & Olson, supra note 154. See also Hennessey v. Richardson Drug Co., IX9 
U.S. 25,34-35 (1903). 
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Blackstone's discussion of "natural born subjects" as an indication 
of what people during the Founding might have looked to in order 
to understand the phrase "natural born Citizen." 156 However, 
Blackstone is "not completely clear or precise." 157 Blackstone 
states, "Natural-born subjects are such as are born within the 
dominions of the crown of England." 15H But he also qualifies the 
statement, noting "all children, born out of the king's ligeance, 
whose fathers were natural-born subjects, are now natural born 
subjects themselves, to all intents and purposes." 15" 
De Ronde translates "natural born Citizen" to "ingeebooren 
burger" (an inborn or innate citizen). As written, De Ronde's 
language is close to a word-for-word literal translation of the 
English text, but in Dutch the language becomes somewhat 
redundant. In Dutch, a 'burger' meant a person who was a citizen 
automatically or at birth, 160 as contrasted to a 'porter,' who was a 
naturalized citizen. 161 The different terms arose from a physical 
understanding of Dutch cities. At the center of old Dutch cities 
was a fort (burg or burcht, the same root existing in the French 
adjective bourgeious); the "poort" was the gate into the city. One 
156. Lawrence I3. Solum, Commentary, Originafism and the Natural Horn Citizen 
Clause, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 22, 23 (200X), 
http://scholarship.law.getngett)Wn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=IX46&context=facpuh. 
157. /d.at27. 
15X. I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 354 
(Oxford, Clarendon 1765-1769), http://avalon.law.yalc.edu/subject_menus/ 
hlackstone.asp. 
159. Solum, supra note 156, at 27. Other evidence cuts both ways. The first 
naturalization act of 1790 provided that "children of citizens of the United States, that may 
he horn beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall he considered as natural 
horn citizens." /d. at 29. On the one hand, this statute could he read as simply codifying 
the original meaning of the citizenship clause. On the other hand, it could he seen as setting 
a discretionary rule beyond that which a common law notion of "natural horn citizen" or 
"natural horn subject" would include. !d. Given the ambiguous evidence, Solum gestures 
towards the "'new originalist'" notion that there can he a point where "interpretation runs 
out" and sources beyond the Constitution's text and the original public meaning of the 
document must he referenced. See id. at 30. 
160. Sewel's 1766 dictionary equates the status of "burger" to one who is free. For the 
English word "infranschise," he says, "(or to make a freeman) iemand burger maaaken." 
BUYS, supra note 113, at 3X6. A recent work exploring the history of idea of citizenship in 
the Netherlands is JOOST KLOEK & KARIN TILMANS, BURGER: EEN GESCHIEDENIS VAN 
HET BEGRIP "BURGER" IN DE NEDERLANDEN VAN DE MIDDELEEUWEN TOT DE 21STE 
EEUW (2002). 
161. Cf. Jakohson, supra note 5X, at 116 (stating that "languages differ essentially in 
what they must convey and not in what they may convey."). Whereas English only has one 
term for citizens, Dutch splits the concept into two terms- one for citizens at birth and 
another for naturalized citizens. 
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thus belonged truly to the center of the city, or one was admitted 
from the outside. The choice of "ingeebooren'' could indicate 
De Ronde's belief that a citizen needed to be born in the United 
States, or the entire phrase could simply be understood as an 
imperfect attempt to literally translate the English text, as 
De Ronde does at many points in the Dutch copy. 
The German translation gestures at the broader 
interpretation of the Natural Born Citizen Clause, using the 
phrase "ein geborner BUrger." A BUrger belonged to a privileged 
group in urban society: he was neither noble nor clergy, but 
nevertheless had, unlike the rest of the population, 162 certain 
freedoms and rights. Although 'BUrger' is thus not a perfect 
substitute for 'citizen,' it could nevertheless be corrtmonly used in 
this way during the eighteenth century, especially when 
translating the Latin term 'civis' or the English 'citizen.' Since 
Germany was not a republic, a more adequate term was not at 
hand.i('3 
"Ein geborner BUrger" then roughly means "a born citizen," 
dropping the term 'natural' entirely. Why did the translator omit 
the word 'natural'? One possibility is that the translator believed 
the notion of "natural born" was completely captured by 
"geborner," that he could not conceive of how sorrteone who was 
"born a citizen" would not be a "natural born Citizen," and that 
he understood such tautology in the original simply as a rhetorical 
cliche .... 
Ersch-Gruher, 164 an early nineteenth century German 
Encyclopedia, includes the statement that "every Son of a Citizen 
is a born Citizen," !hs which could easily be regarded as 
tautological. Naturalization or birth were the only two ways of 
162. The so-called "viL:rtcr Stand" (fourth estate). 
163. Adclung lists a number of different meanings of the term 'Burger." First, a 
Burger is defined as an inhabitant of a city whose inhabitants were allowed to partake in 
the freedom the town itself had (the word is traced hack to "Burg" ("castle") which is 
understood to refer to any fortified place). Second, as the so-called "third estate," in 
contrast to the nobles and clergyman. Third, as a translation for the Latin "civis," in a 
republic or a comparable form of slate. Finally- in a figurative meaning- anyone living in 
a town. I ADEUJNG, supra note 100, at 1263(1). 
164. ALLGEMEINE ENCYCLOPADIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN UNIJ K()NSTE IN 
ALPIIABETISCIIFR FOI <iE YON GLNANNTEN SCIIRIFTSTELLERN BEARBFITET (J.S. Ersch 
& J.G. Gruber cds., Leipzig, IX21 ). 
165. !d. at 3lJ (".Ieder Burgcrsohn isl gchorncr Burger, fOr Frcmdc ahcr ist die 
Burgcrannahmc mit grolkn Schwicrigkcitcn vcrhundcn"). 
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becoming a "Burger," tertium non datur, and due to the blood 
principle, a child born oversees would not need to be 
naturalized. 166 Notably, in German-language discussions of the 
Natural Born Citizen clause during the early nineteenth century, 
the "natural" is usually omitted. 167 "[N]aturally born" is simply 
understood to stand in contrast to the cases of adoption (and the 
special case of residence in part of Missouri at the time of the 
F h • ) IN\ rene cession . 
F. THE RECESS APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE 
Recess of the Senate, Art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
English 
The President shall have 
Power to fill up all 
Vacancies that may 
happen during the Recess 
of the Senate, by granting 
Commissions which shall 
expire at the End of their 
next Session. 
German 
Ocr Prasident soli Gewalt 
hahen, aile erlcdigte 
Stellen, die sich wahrend 
dem, da der Senat nicht 
sitzt, 
durch 
creigncn m()gcn, 
Ertheilung dcr 
Commissioncn zu 
hesctzcn, wclchc am Endc 
der nachstcn Sitzung 
Dutch 
De President zal magt 
hchhcn om aile vacantc 
plaatsen die mogcn 
voorvallcn gcdurendc de 
afwcezenthyd van de 
Scnaat, op tc vullcn door 
commtsstcs tc vcrgunncn 
wclkc zullcn ophouden 
met hct cijnde van haar 
dcsselhcn aufh()ren sollen. naast volgcndc sitting. 
In January 2012, President Obama appointed Richard 
Cordray to head the newly-created Consumer Financial 
166. Similar to the case in the Netherlands, the principle of naturalization sprung 
from a Roman legal custom already abolished during the middle ages where unfree 
inhabitants (serfs, etc.) were considered free "a year and a day" after they had arrived-
leading to the saying "Stadtluft macht frci" (breathing city-air sets you free). However, 
unlike in Dutch, the German terminology docs not differ between "Porter" and "Burger." 
There were, however, differences in practice: only the "gesworcnc Buerger'' (the sworn 
citizen) had equal rights, and since naturalization usually was hound to the question of 
property, in the majority of cases only the second generation (that was then also inborn) 
would have reached such status. 
167. If, at the time in Germany, the phrase "naturally horn" was ever used outside 
the context of the United States Constitution, then it was either in a theological context 
(distinguishing the natural birth from the rebirth by faith, or contrasting the naturally horn 
humans from the God-made Adam) or in a medical context (obstetrics). 
loX. See AMERICA IM JAHRE IX31 at 304 (C. N. Ri)ding ed., Hamburg, Hoffman 
IX32) (summarizing the U.S. Constitution). A similar omission can he found in another 
contemporary work. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, DR. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN'S LEBEN 424 
(Weimar, Verlage des Landesindustric-Comptoirs !XIX) (stating "ltlhe American 
Certificate of Naturalization grants foreigners, who have been domestic there for seven 
years, all rights of inborn subjects."). 
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Protection Bureau ("CFPB"), as well as three other individuals to 
the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"). 1(,9 Cordray's 
nomination had been blocked by a Senate filibuster since July 
2011. 170 The President had acted during what the executive 
claimed was a "Recess of the Senate," permitting him to bypass 
the requirement to receive the "Consent of the Senate." At the 
time of the appointments, the Senate was meeting in pro forma 
sessions every three business days from Decernber 20, 2011, 
through January 22, 2012, rather than officially ending the 
legislative session. 171 Often the meetings lasted "minutes or even 
seconds ... to meet the definition of holding a Congressional 
meeting." 172 Senate Democrats had used the same tactic in the 
past to prevent President Bush from making recess 
• 171 
appOintments. · 
The question of whether President Obama's appointments 
qualified as occurring "during the Recess" made its way to the 
Supreme Court and was answered in June 2014. All nine justices 
held that the appointments were unconstitutional, however they 
disagreed on why. Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer held 
that the term "the Recess" includes both the intersession recess 
between Senate sessions and "an intra-session recess of 
substantiallength." 174 The majority understood the purpose of the 
clause as preventing governmental action from grinding to a halt 
during the Senate's extended absence. 175 As the D.C. Circuit 
noted in the same case, "[ a]t the time of the Constitution, 
intersession recesses were regularly six to nine ... rnonths ... and 
senators did not have the luxury of catching the next flight to 
Washington." 17(, Although the President could hypothetically 
169. Hcknc Cooper & Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate, 0/Jama Appoints 
Consumer Chief: N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2012, http://www.nytimcs.com/2012/01/05/us/politics/ 
richanJ-c(mJray-namcd-c<msumcr-chid-in-rcccss-appointmcnl.html. 
170. !d. 
171. See Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.ld 4l)0, 4W\ (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
172. Cooper & Steinhauer, supra note 16l). 
171. !d. 
174. NLRI3 v. Noel Canning, 114 S. Ct. 2550, 2561 (2014). 
175. !d. at2565-66 ("]The framers] might have expected that the Senate would meet 
for a singk session lasting at most half a ycar.")./d. at25l)X (Scalia, J., concurring) ("']T]hc 
majority contends that the Clause's supposed purpose of keeping the wheels of 
government turning demands that we interpret the Clause to maintain its relevance in light 
of ]new circumstances]."). 
176. Noel Canning, 705 F.ld at 501 (citing Michael B. Rappaport, The Original 
Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 14X7, 14l)X (2005)). 
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exercise the recess appointments power during an intra-session 
break of the Senate, the Court deemed the three-day break at 
issue was too short to constitute a break that would activate the 
recess appointments power. 177 In contrast, Justice Scalia's 
concurrence maintained that the term "the Recess" could only 
refer to the single intersession recess that occurred between 
formal legislative sessions. m "[I]f 'the next Session' denotes a 
formal session, then "the Recess" must mean the break between 
formal sessions." 179 
Although most of the German translation of the Constitution 
is literal, the Recess Clause is paraphrased. "[D]uring the recess 
of the Senate" became "da der Senat nicht sitzt"- "when the 
Senate is not sitting." In the same manner the German translator 
circumscribes "recess" in art. II, § 2, cl. 3. De Ronde translates the 
recess clause to "gedurende de afweezenthyd van de Senaat" -or 
"during the extended absence of the Senate." In other Dutch 
documents from the period, the word 'afweezenthyd' is used when 
an official or member of royalty is absent from a place for months 
or years, such as when one is on an extended trip abroad. In this 
sense, it is different from the modern Dutch 'afwezigheid' which 
refers more generally to one's absence, or to one being merely 
"not present," such as when one does not attend a business 
meeting. De Ronde's choice of 'afweezenthyd' indicates that he 
interpreted the original to mean that the absence was more than 
immediate or temporary, but extended. 
The Dutch translation gestures at the underlying purpose of 
the Recess Appointments Clause- to give the President the 
power to get work done when the Senate was absent for an 
extended period of time and, by extension, could not approve a 
candidate. Because of the difficulty and slow pace of travel in the 
late eighteenth-century, senators would literally be unable to 
approve nominees when they left the Capitol to return to their 
home states. The Recess Clause would have allowed the President 
to temporarily fill vacancies during periods when the senators 
were absent for an extended period of time. 
In contrast, the German translation brings less clarity to the 
Noel Canning question. The definite article-"the Recess"-is 
177. Noel Canning, 1~4 S. Ct. at 2566. 
17X. /d. at 2592 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
179. /d. at 2596 (Scalia, J ., concurring). 
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absent from the German translation. And the eighteenth-century 
German distinction between 'seance' and 'session'- the former 
meaning the individual meeting, the latter the longer period of 
time convened, including adjournments-does not provide much 
guidance because "to sit" is the root of both nouns. 1so 
Nonetheless, the German translator's choices can contribute 
to the discussion. Although he uses "sitting" in the sense of 
"seance" in art. I, § 3, cl. 6, his understanding of the word 'recess' 
becomes more clear when paraphrasing it in art. 1, § 3, cl. 2. In that 
clause, "recess" is understood as the interim period after the 
assembly has parted ("wahrend der Zeit, da 
auseinandergegangen ist") until the next "coming-together" (the 
literal meaning of "Zusammenkunft"). However, only so much 
can be read into this phrasing, because the transllator also uses 
"Zusammenkunft" in the case of adjournment. 1s1 
G. FELONY 
Art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
English German Dutch 
They shall m all Cases, Sic sollcn in allen Eilkn, Zu lK? wllcn m alk 
except Treason, Felony Hochvcrrath, gcvallcn, uitgczondcrt 
and Breach of the Peace, Hauptvcrhrcchcn und van vcrraad, dood 
he privileged from Fricdcnshruch waerdig1~ misdaad en 
Arrest .... ausgcnommcn, von verhrcki ngc van vrccdc, 
Arrcsttirung wah rend het voorrcgt hchhcn om 
dcm .... niet gcarrcstcerd tc 
worden .... 
lXO. "Session is the row of meetings until an Ajourncmcnt, therefore Session and 
Seance (Sitzung) arc not to he confused." 1 DE LA CROIX, VERFASSUNG DER 
VORNEHMSTEN EUROPAISCHEN UND DER VEREINIGTEN 
AMERIKANISCHEN STAATEN 320 (1792). Adclung also understands "session" not as 
a single meeting, hut as longer period ("Sitzungspcriodc"), whereas the single meeting, in 
contrast, is called "seance." Sec ADELlJNG, supra note 100. Our translator seems to 
follow this distinction by translating "Sitzung" as "session." An interpretative decision on 
what is meant hy "Recess" is however avoided hy using a verb instead of a noun, thereby 
creating an amhivalcncc, since "to sit" is the vcrh form both of "seance" and "session." 
1 X 1. lJ .S. CON ST. ( ( Ierman ), supra note 1, art. II, * 3. 
1 X2. "Zu" should he "zc" ("they"). There is no word 'zu' in Dutch. 
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Art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
English German Dutch 
To define and punish Seerauherey und Om te hepalen en te 
Piracies and Felonies Hauptverhrechen, die auf straffen zeerooverien en 
committed on the high der ollenen See hegangen doodwaardige misdaaden 
Seas .... werden .... gepleegt op de hooge 
zee .... 
Art. IV,§ 2, cl. 2. 
English German Dutch 
A Person charged in any Wenn jemand In einem Een persoon in eenige 
State with Treason, Staate des Hochverraths. staat heschuldight van 
Felony, or other Crime, cines Haupt- oder andern verraad, felony of andere 
who shall Ike from Verhrechens heschuldigt misdaad, die van de justitie 
Justice .... wird, und der Gerechtigkeit zoude vlieden .... 
entfliehet .... 
The term 'felony' has had a very broad and frequently 
changing meaning. Writing in 1823, Massachusetts lawyer and 
legislator Nathan Dane wrote in his treatise on American law, 
"[T]he word felony, in the process of many centuries, has derived 
so many meanings from so many parts of the common law, and so 
many statutes in England, and has got to be used in such a vast 
number of different senses, that it is impossible to know precisely 
in what sense we are to understand this word." 1x3 Although 
felonies were traditionally punished by forfeiture of property or 
death under the common law in England, 1x4 in America at the time 
of Dane's writing, there were "many felonies, not one punished 
1X3. 6 NATHAN DANE, DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 715 (Boston. Cummings, 
Hilliard & Co. 1X23). 
1X4. See Will Tress, Unintended Collateral Consequences: Defining Felonv in the Early 
American Republic, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 461,463-65 (2009). 
46 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 31:1 
with forfeiture of estate, and but a very few with death." 1s5 
Blackstone similarly explained, "Felony, in the general 
acceptance of our English law, comprises every species of crime, 
which occasioned at common law the forfeiture of lands or 
d "li\6 goo s. 
For "felony," the German translator chose the word 
"Hauptverbrechen." In the present day, the term is no longer in 
use. 1s
7 In the tradition of the early penal codes and its 
translations, Jss it meant "head crime"- one automatically 
punished by death, usually decapitation. 1s9 Like the English term 
'felony,' 'Hauptverbrechen' had already experienced a 
considerable semantic shift in Germany by the late eighteenth 
century, and the translator could have intended the term to 
encompass a variety of meanings. Most likely, he intended a more 
modern meaning, since fundamental changes in the penal system 
had already severed the direct link between the gravity of the 
offense and the punishment. 190 The secondary meaning "Haupt-" 
always possessed outside the field of criminal law ("main") had 
largely replaced the primary meaning ("capital") even in the field 
of penal law. 1') 1 In contract law, "Haupt-Pflicht" ("'capital duty") 
was already understood to be the main duty of a party, and in the 
Field of Ethics, "Haupttugend" ("capital virtue") could stand in 
for "Kardinaltugend" ("cardinal virtue"). 1<)2 \Vhen Campe's 
Dictionary defines "Hauptverbrechen" in 1808, there is no 
explicit reference made to the death-penalty. Instead the term is 
IX5. 6 DANE, supra note IX3. at 715. 
!Xo. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 15X, at ll4. See a/so BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (lith 
cd. 200ll) (defining 'felony,' at common law, as "an offense for which conviction results in 
forfeiture of the defendant's lands or goods (or hot h) to the Crown, regardless of whether 
any capital or other punishment is mandated."). 
IX7. A cognate of 'Hauptverhrechen,' 'Kapitai-Verhrechen' might still he found, 
especially as a layman's term. Another term frequently used today is 'Haupttat,' also 
translating to "capital crime," hut which is presently used to distinguish the crime of the 
main perpetrator from that of the accessory. 
lXX. The Latin "res capitalis" and "pecccatum mortalc" would usually translate as 
"Haupt!-]" or "Capitai-Vcrhrechen." 
!Xll. For example, the "Constituito Criminalis Carolina" of 1532 was colloquially 
called "Halsgerichtsordnung" ("throat criminal code") since the usual punishment in the 
Carolina was death. 
lliO. A key change in Germany was to render punishment that was not only adequate 
to the crime committed, hut also appropriate in light of a perpetrator's individual level of 
guilt. See generally ERNST CHRISTIAN WESTPHAL, DAS CRIMINALRECIIT (Leipzig, 17X5). 
Ill!. See 2 JOACIIIM HEINRICH CAMPE, WORTERBlJCH DER DEUTSCHEN SPRACHE 
572 (Braunschweig, Schulhuchhandlung IXOX) ("Hauptverrath"). 
lll2. 2 ADELUNCI, supra note 100, at lOll) ("Haupttungend"). 
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defined as "a grand, grave crime (capital crime)," 1')3 although 
German legal scholars of the early nineteenth century would still 
have to debate what was meant when interpreting a law that uses 
the term. 1')4 When Johann Joachim Eschenburg used the term in 
1783, he stated that the usual punishment for murder, as a capital 
crime, was banishment, a statement which would be contradictory 
if "Hauptverbrechen" required the death penalty. llJ) 
Evidence that such semantic shift was taking place is 
particularly visible in a German translation of the proposed 
Seventh Amendment (which became codified as the Fifth 
Amendment) from the early 1800s. The phrase "capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime" is simply translated as "Haupt-
Verbrechens," illustrating that the term could serve as a 
translation for both "capital crimes" in the literal sense, and those 
crimes that are "as infamous" as such crimes. 1')(, 
In the Dutch translation, despite the allegedly amorphous 
meaning of 'felony,' De Ronde used a strikingly unambiguous 
term in translation. De Ronde translated "felony" to 
"doodwaardige misdaaden"- literally, "crimes worthy of death" 
(except in art. IV,§ 2, where he curiously says "felony,'' without 
translation). De Ronde's choice particularly suggests that despite 
the vague meaning of 'felony' before and after the Founding, 
some individuals might have still understood it as having a clear, 
I Y3. CAMPE, supra note I Yl ("Hauptvcrhrcchcn "). 
I Y4. For example, in Bavaria in 1 H56, the question arose of whether "capital crimes" 
in the Bavarian Criminal Code of I H13 meant only those crimes that were punished with 
death. See BLATTER FUR RECHTSANWENDUNG ZUNACIIST IN BA YERN (Johann Adam 
Scuffcrt & Ernst August Scuffcrt cds., Erlangcn, Palm & Enkc IH56). At first glance, this 
dchatc might point against the modern usc. However, the text presumes that people 
(already) used the term in the more modern sense of "severe crime"- this hcing the reason 
why there was need for the dchatc at all. 
1Y5. JOHANN JOACHIM ESCHENBURG, HANDBlJCH DI·R KLASSISCHEN LITERATUR 
(Berlin, Nicolai 17H3). Eschenburg's suhjcct is Greek antiquity, so it docs not say much 
ahout the usc of "Hauptvcrhrcchcn" in a more modern legal context. Nevertheless it is 
significant that the author can usc the term in such context (meaning for a crime that was 
not generally punished with death) without hcing contradictory. 
I YO. See CiESEZE DER REPUBLIK PENNSYLVANIEN, IN (JBERSE:ITEN AUSZUGEN. 
ENTHALTEND DIE BRAUCHBAREN 0FFENTLIC'HEN GESFZE BIS ZlJ DEM JAHR 1H05, 
EINSCHLIESSLICH: SO WIE AUG! DIE REGIERlJN(JS-Vl'RFASSUNGEN DER VFREINIGTEN 
STAATEN UNO VON PENNSYLVANIEN, HRG. UNDER AUTIIORITAT LINES CiESEZES DER 
GENERAL-ASSEMBLY, PASSIRT IM APRIL, IH05, at xx-xxii (Reading, Gcdruckt und 
Hcrausgcgchcn von Johann Ritter und Carl Kessler I K07), http://modcrn-
constitutions.de/US-00-17H7-0lJ-17-dc-a-17KlJ-I-c.html. Two other nineteenth century 
translators of the U.S. Constitution into German completely omit the word "capital" in 
their translations. See I DIPPEL, supra note I, at H4 n.6. 
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narrow meaning-namely, a capital crime. 
H. HIGH CRIMES & MISDEMEANORS 
Art. II, § 4. 
English 
The President, Vice 
President, and all civil 
Officers of the United 
States, shall he removed 
from Office on 
Impeachment for, and 
Conviction of, Treason, 
Bribery, or other high 
Crimes 
Misuemean<Jrs. 
and 
German 
Der Prasiuent, Vin.:-
Prasiuent uno aile 
hurgcrliche Beamte ocr 
Vereinigten Staaten sollen 
ilues Amtes entsctzt 
wcruen, wenn SIC wcgen 
Hoehverraths, 
Bestcchung oucr anuerer 
hohen Verhreehen uno 
Dutch 
De President, Vice-
President en aile 
hurgclyke ollicianten van 
de Vcreenigue Staaten 
zullen afgezct worden van 
haar officie, op een 
impeachment voor, en 
overtuigen van, verraau, 
hri hery, of andere sware 
l Jchelthaten Mfcntlich misuaauen en 
angeklagt uno uavon wangedragingen. 
OherfOhrct weruen. 
The phrase "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" is, at first 
glance, fairly opaque. A clue to its meaning comes from 
Blackstone, who distinguished "high treason''' from "petit 
treason." Petit treason included breaches of "private and 
domestic" allegiances. l'n High treason constituted crimes against 
society as a whole. 19x Following on this distinction~ Raoul Berger 
explained that the English treated "high crimes and 
misdemeanors" as "a category of political crimes against the 
state." 199 Berger's analysis claimed "high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors'' included misapplication of funds, abuse of official 
power, neglect of duty, encroachment upon parliamentary 
prerogatives, corruption, betrayal of trust, and giving pernicious 
advice to the Crown. 200 Berger concludes, "[t]he phrase 'high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors,' ... is not concerned with 'high' in the 
sense of 'serious' crimes as such, but with misconduct by officials 
in high places who are immune to ordinary forms of judicial or 
I lJ7. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 15X, at 75. 
llJX. See Gary L. McDowell, "1/igh Crimes and Misdemeanors": Recovering the 
Intentions of the Founders, o7 ClEO. WASil. L. REV. o2o, o3X (llJYY) (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, 
supra note 15X, at 75, 203). 
I lJlJ. RAOUL BER<iER, IMPEACHMENT: TilE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 04 (llJ74). 
200. !d. at 71-73. 
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political control." 201 Michael Gerhardt similarly reads "high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors" as "not limited to indictable offenses, 
but rather includ[ing] great offenses against the federal 
government. ,202 
The German translator writes "hohen Verbrechen und 
Uebelthaten," or "high Crimes and Misdeeds," where 'hohen' 
most literally means high (as in altitude). The German text is 
much more ambivalent here than in the case of 
"Hauptverbrechen" and more complex than the English and 
Dutch prints. The choice of the German translator to use "hoch" 
("high") in this passage, together with his choice in art. Ill,§ 3, cl. 
1, to substitute "Treason" with "Hochverrath" ("high treason"), 
tracks Blackstone's distinction between high and petit treason. 
But although "Hochverrat" ("high treason") in contemporary 
German was understood to denote treason, directed against the 
state or its head, 203 this understanding is muddied by the fact that 
'high' and 'capital' were sometimes used as synonyms in the late 
eighteenth-century legal discourse. 204 Not only could 'high' and 
'capital' both refer to the seriousness of the crime, as already 
presumed in the case of "felony" ("Haupt-Verbrechen"), but 
"Haupt-" could, as in the case of treason, be used to denote 
offences against the state and its leader, with the consequence that 
the term 'Hauptverrath' and 'Hochverrath' become 
interchangeable in this semantic context. 205 Campe's Dictionary 
from 1808 accordingly lists both possibilities when explaining 
"Hochverbrechen" ("high crime"): the broader meaning of "a 
grave or exceptional crime," and the more narrow meaning of 
"crime directed against the state or its head." 206 
201. Thomas I. Emerson, Impeachment: The Constitutional Prohlems, 74 COLUM. L. 
REV. 131, 133 (1974) (reviewing BERGER, supra note 199). 
202. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, TilE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS 104---05 (2d 
ed. 2000). "I 0 !elegates to state ratification conventions often referred to impeachahle 
offenses as 'great' offenses, and ... frequently spoke of how impeachment should apply if 
the official 'deviates from his duty' or if he 'dare to ahuse the powers vested in him hy the 
people."' !d. (some internal quotation marks omitted). 
203. See I ADELUNG, supra note 100 (defining 'Hochverrath' as a treason directed 
against the state or its head). 
204. A legal example is again the case of treason, where "high treason" (Hoch-verrat) 
and "capital treason" (Haupt-Verrath) were understood to he synonymous. See id. 
(" Haupt-verrath "). 
205. See 2 CAMPE, supra note 191, at 572 ("Haupt-verrath"). 
206. 2 CAMPE, supra note 191, at 753 ("Hochverhrechen"). Campe also lists hoth 
possihle meanings for 'hochverrat' (high treason). See id. 
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These usages in mind, it might be prudent not to read too 
much intent into the German translation of "high Crimes," since 
there is a general tendency of the draft's German translator to 
translate as literally as possible, and hereby to choose a cognate 
or even use an Anglicism, without giving much thought to the 
question of whether the cognate in the individual case would be 
the most appropriate German term to stand in for the original 
term. So, although the specific definition of "high treason" in the 
German system and its deliberate choice by the translator could 
accord with a translator's intention to evoke Blackstone's notion 
of high crime rather than petit crime (a distinction that even had 
found its way into Kruenitz's Encyclopedia207 during the early 19th 
century), the possible synonymy of 'high' and 'capital' may render 
the German translator's verbatim choice less significant. In the 
case of our translator and his tendency for verbatim translation, 
this could even be much more likely the case; his literal translation 
of "high" could simply be an example of where the German 
translator translated in a rote manner. 
In Dutch, De Ronde says, "wangedragingen," for 
"misdemeanors," meaning "misconducts" or "misbehaviors." 
However "high Crimes" emerges in De Ronde's Dutch as "sware 
misdaaden"- "serious crimes." De Ronde's translation likely 
says more about the public's understanding of the phrase "high 
Crimes" than about whether Berger and Gerhardt correctly 
identified the phrase's origins. De Ronde was not a lawyer and 
could easily have been unaware of Blackstone and other sources 
that distinguish between high and petit treason. The translation of 
"high Crimes" then presents a particularly stark exan1ple of how 
the intent of the authors of the Constitution might significantly 
deviate from the publicly-understood meaning of the phrase. 
Supposing that "high Crimes" was meant to evoke a crime against 
the state, De Ronde's translation illustrates that some members 
of the Founding-era public may have understood the language to 
simply mean "serious crimes" as opposed to minor or 
unimportant crimes. 
This observation is particularly notable in light of John 
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport's proposition that the lay 
public would have recognized legal language in the Constitution 
207. Kruenitz remarks that "the English" make a distinction between "high" and 
"petty treason." See KRlJENITZ, supra note 102 (''Hoehverrath"). 
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and refrained from coming to a judgment about its meamng. 
McGinnis and Rappaport argue that 
It is a common, if not universal, reaction for a layperson to read 
a legal document, whether a contract, statute, or a constitution, 
and have the following reaction: "Well, it seems to mean X to 
me, but I am not a lawyer. To be sure of its meaning, I will need 
a lawyer to read it." ... This example suggests that the linguistic 
practice of the community would give priority to legal 
interpretive rules and to the lawyer's understanding of legal 
documents, such as the Constitution. 20H 
De Ronde's translation suggests that at least some members 
of the educated, Founding-era public might not have always 
recognized each of the legal or specialized terms in the 
Constitution. As a result, they may have developed their own 
interpretations of the language and failed, as De Ronde did, to 
defer to a lawyer's interpretation. Alternatively, one might 
imagine that De Ronde did not have the opportunity to 
corroborate his interpretation and was not actually subjectively 
certain of the Constitution's meaning on this point. This view is 
possible given De Ronde's preference for using cognates instead 
of locutions to express American legal concepts. 20') On the other 
hand, it might also be implausible to suppose that De Ronde 
translated and published a text that he affirmatively believed 
might be incorrect. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has analyzed two Founding-era translations of 
the United States Constitution and considered their usefulness as 
a means of interpreting the Constitution's text. Our exegesis 
illustrates that the translations provide useful insight, but are also 
limited in significant ways. 
Because translation presupposes interpretation, the 
particular choices of the translators can be understood as 
Founding-era commentaries on the Constitution. Commentary is 
not only present where the translators paraphrased or even chose 
to substitute a technical term with an extended explanation. 
Rather, the translator's choice of words and sentence structure 
20X. JOHN 0. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, 0RI(iiNALISM AND THE GOOD 
CONSTITUTION 12(1 (2013). 
20Y. See supra note 7X and accompanying text. 
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itself inherently reflects analysis. The fact that languages are far 
from isomorphic, that in a large number of cases the translator 
had the option or need to choose from among tnany terms or 
phrases with varied meanings, sheds light on how a member of the 
Founding-era public would have understood the English-
language text. Indeed, the examples we treated in this paper 
collectively illustrate a range of views that the Founding-era 
public might have had about the content of the Constitution. 
Our discussion also highlighted a number of limitations 
present when using the Founding-era translations as an 
interpretive tool. The issues range from how authoritative a 
translator's understanding of a legal text can be, to how conscious 
the translator was of the nuanced meaning of his choices. While 
these issues are significant, the translations still can serve as a 
piece of the interpretive puzzle and add to our understanding of 
the Constitution as a whole. Despite any annbiguities and 
disagreements, the translations provide additional evidence of the 
Constitution's original public meaning and ought to stand 
alongside contemporary news articles, commentaries, convention 
notes, and dictionary definitions. 
The limitations of using translations to interpret the original 
text are most clearly apparent in those cases where our translators 
disagree on the meaning of a passage. Whereas De Ronde's 
translation of "regulate" preserves the idea of regulation as 
"making regular," the German translation appears to allow the 
government greater latitude to establish commerce where it might 
not have previously existed. De Ronde's notion of "proper" laws 
concerns whether they achieve their ends, whereas the German 
translator's "proper" law is merely a required one. Although the 
German translations of "high Crimes" and "felony" track the 
dominant academic and contemporary understanding of the 
terms, De Ronde's translations deviate sharply from those 
interpretations. His translation of "high Crimes" evokes severity 
rather than a crime against the state; similarly, his translation of 
"felony"- "crime worthy of death"- is both highly specific and at 
odds with existing English and American law. 
Such semantic dissociation between the two translations can 
be understood as either an example of differing interpretations, 
or as a contingent result of the translation process as a more or 
less conscious and controlled activity that inevitably leads to 
differences and even errors. The latter possibility 1might often be 
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the case with these translators' work. The fact that even within 
their own translations, certain terms are not applied in a 
consistent way calls into question the usefulness of understanding 
every word-choice as an interpretative argument. It is also worth 
recognizing that agreement between the translators does not 
necessarily indicate their interpretation reflected that of the rest 
of the Founding-era public. Agreement could spring from a 
consensus on the meaning of a respective passage, but could also 
simply be a case of coincidence. Concord in these cases does 
nevertheless have a significant heuristic value: there is a good 
chance that the translations agree with each other for a reason. 
Coupled with the translations' historic value, these insights render 
the Founding-era translations of the United States Constitution 
an invaluable source for constitutional scholars and lawyers 
today. For too long, they languished in obscurity-now they may 
be read, criticized, and reinterpreted. 
